/* ************************************************************************* * Ralink Tech Inc. * 5F., No.36, Taiyuan St., Jhubei City, * Hsinchu County 302, * Taiwan, R.O.C. * * (c) Copyright 2002-2010, Ralink Technology, Inc. * * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify * * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by * * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or * * (at your option) any later version. * * * * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, * * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of * * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the * * GNU General Public License for more details. * * * * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License * * along with this program; if not, write to the * * Free Software Foundation, Inc., * * 59 Temple Place - Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307, USA. * * * *************************************************************************/ #include "rt_config.h" /* WPA OUI*/ UCHAR OUI_WPA[3] = {0x00, 0x50, 0xF2}; UCHAR OUI_WPA_NONE_AKM[4] = {0x00, 0x50, 0xF2, 0x00}; UCHAR OUI_WPA_VERSION[4] = {0x00, 0x50, 0xF2, 0x01}; UCHAR OUI_WPA_WEP40[4] = {0x00, 0x50, 0xF2, 0x01}; UCHAR OUI_WPA_TKIP[4] = {0x00, 0x50, 0xF2, 0x02}; UCHAR OUI_WPA_CCMP[4] = {0x00, 0x50, 0xF2, 0x04}; UCHAR OUI_WPA_WEP104[4] = {0x00, 0x50, 0xF2, 0x05}; UCHAR OUI_WPA_8021X_AKM[4] = {0x00, 0x50, 0xF2, 0x01}; UCHAR OUI_WPA_PSK_AKM[4] = {0x00, 0x50, 0xF2, 0x02}; /* WPA2 OUI*/ UCHAR OUI_WPA2[3] = {0x00, 0x0F, 0xAC}; UCHAR OUI_WPA2_WEP40[4] = {0x00, 0x0F, 0xAC, 0x01}; UCHAR OUI_WPA2_TKIP[4] = {0x00, 0x0F, 0xAC, 0x02}; UCHAR OUI_WPA2_CCMP[4] = {0x00, 0x0F, 0xAC, 0x04}; UCHAR OUI_WPA2_8021X_AKM[4] = {0x00, 0x0F, 0xAC, 0x01}; UCHAR OUI_WPA2_PSK_AKM[4] = {0x00, 0x0F, 0xAC, 0x02}; UCHAR OUI_WPA2_WEP104[4] = {0x00, 0x0F, 0xAC, 0x05}; static VOID ConstructEapolKeyData( IN PMAC_TABLE_ENTRY pEntry, IN UCHAR GroupKeyWepStatus, IN UCHAR keyDescVer, IN UCHAR MsgType, IN UCHAR DefaultKeyIdx, IN UCHAR *GTK, IN UCHAR *RSNIE, IN UCHAR RSNIE_LEN, OUT PEAPOL_PACKET pMsg); static VOID WpaEAPPacketAction( IN PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd, IN MLME_QUEUE_ELEM *Elem); static VOID WpaEAPOLASFAlertAction( IN PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd, IN MLME_QUEUE_ELEM *Elem); static VOID WpaEAPOLLogoffAction( IN PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd, IN MLME_QUEUE_ELEM *Elem); static VOID WpaEAPOLStartAction( IN PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd, IN MLME_QUEUE_ELEM *Elem); static VOID WpaEAPOLKeyAction( IN PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd, IN MLME_QUEUE_ELEM *Elem); /* ========================================================================== Description: association state machine init, including state transition and timer init Parameters: S - pointer to the association state machine ========================================================================== */ VOID WpaStateMachineInit( IN PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd, IN STATE_MACHINE *S, OUT STATE_MACHINE_FUNC Trans[]) { StateMachineInit(S, (STATE_MACHINE_FUNC *)Trans, MAX_WPA_PTK_STATE, MAX_WPA_MSG, (STATE_MACHINE_FUNC)Drop, WPA_PTK, WPA_MACHINE_BASE); StateMachineSetAction(S, WPA_PTK, MT2_EAPPacket, (STATE_MACHINE_FUNC)WpaEAPPacketAction); StateMachineSetAction(S, WPA_PTK, MT2_EAPOLStart, (STATE_MACHINE_FUNC)WpaEAPOLStartAction); StateMachineSetAction(S, WPA_PTK, MT2_EAPOLLogoff, (STATE_MACHINE_FUNC)WpaEAPOLLogoffAction); StateMachineSetAction(S, WPA_PTK, MT2_EAPOLKey, (STATE_MACHINE_FUNC)WpaEAPOLKeyAction); StateMachineSetAction(S, WPA_PTK, MT2_EAPOLASFAlert, (STATE_MACHINE_FUNC)WpaEAPOLASFAlertAction); } /* ========================================================================== Description: this is state machine function. When receiving EAP packets which is for 802.1x authentication use. Not use in PSK case Return: ========================================================================== */ VOID WpaEAPPacketAction( IN PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd, IN MLME_QUEUE_ELEM *Elem) { } VOID WpaEAPOLASFAlertAction( IN PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd, IN MLME_QUEUE_ELEM *Elem) { } VOID WpaEAPOLLogoffAction( IN PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd, IN MLME_QUEUE_ELEM *Elem) { } /* ========================================================================== Description: Start 4-way HS when rcv EAPOL_START which may create by our driver in assoc.c Return: ========================================================================== */ VOID WpaEAPOLStartAction( IN PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd, IN MLME_QUEUE_ELEM *Elem) { MAC_TABLE_ENTRY *pEntry; PHEADER_802_11 pHeader; #ifdef CONFIG_STA_SUPPORT #endif /* CONFIG_STA_SUPPORT */ DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("WpaEAPOLStartAction ===> \n")); pHeader = (PHEADER_802_11)Elem->Msg; /*For normaol PSK, we enqueue an EAPOL-Start command to trigger the process.*/ if (Elem->MsgLen == 6) pEntry = MacTableLookup(pAd, Elem->Msg); else { pEntry = MacTableLookup(pAd, pHeader->Addr2); } if (pEntry) { DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, (" PortSecured(%d), WpaState(%d), AuthMode(%d), PMKID_CacheIdx(%d) \n", pEntry->PortSecured, pEntry->WpaState, pEntry->AuthMode, pEntry->PMKID_CacheIdx)); if ((pEntry->PortSecured == WPA_802_1X_PORT_NOT_SECURED) && (pEntry->WpaState < AS_PTKSTART) && ((pEntry->AuthMode == Ndis802_11AuthModeWPAPSK) || (pEntry->AuthMode == Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA2PSK) || ((pEntry->AuthMode == Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA2) && (pEntry->PMKID_CacheIdx != ENTRY_NOT_FOUND)))) { pEntry->PrivacyFilter = Ndis802_11PrivFilter8021xWEP; pEntry->WpaState = AS_INITPSK; pEntry->PortSecured = WPA_802_1X_PORT_NOT_SECURED; NdisZeroMemory(pEntry->R_Counter, sizeof(pEntry->R_Counter)); pEntry->ReTryCounter = PEER_MSG1_RETRY_TIMER_CTR; WPAStart4WayHS(pAd, pEntry, PEER_MSG1_RETRY_EXEC_INTV); } } } /* ========================================================================== Description: This is state machine function. When receiving EAPOL packets which is for 802.1x key management. Use both in WPA, and WPAPSK case. In this function, further dispatch to different functions according to the received packet. 3 categories are : 1. normal 4-way pairwisekey and 2-way groupkey handshake 2. MIC error (Countermeasures attack) report packet from STA. 3. Request for pairwise/group key update from STA Return: ========================================================================== */ VOID WpaEAPOLKeyAction( IN PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd, IN MLME_QUEUE_ELEM *Elem) { MAC_TABLE_ENTRY *pEntry; PHEADER_802_11 pHeader; PEAPOL_PACKET pEapol_packet; KEY_INFO peerKeyInfo; UINT eapol_len; #ifdef CONFIG_STA_SUPPORT #endif /* CONFIG_STA_SUPPORT */ DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("WpaEAPOLKeyAction ===>\n")); pHeader = (PHEADER_802_11)Elem->Msg; pEapol_packet = (PEAPOL_PACKET)&Elem->Msg[LENGTH_802_11 + LENGTH_802_1_H]; eapol_len = CONV_ARRARY_TO_UINT16(pEapol_packet->Body_Len) + LENGTH_EAPOL_H; NdisZeroMemory((PUCHAR)&peerKeyInfo, sizeof(peerKeyInfo)); NdisMoveMemory((PUCHAR)&peerKeyInfo, (PUCHAR)&pEapol_packet->KeyDesc.KeyInfo, sizeof(KEY_INFO)); *((USHORT *)&peerKeyInfo) = cpu2le16(*((USHORT *)&peerKeyInfo)); do { pEntry = MacTableLookup(pAd, pHeader->Addr2); if (!pEntry || (!IS_ENTRY_CLIENT(pEntry) && !IS_ENTRY_APCLI(pEntry))) break; if (pEntry->AuthMode < Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA) break; DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("Receive EAPoL-Key frame from STA %02X-%02X-%02X-%02X-%02X-%02X\n", PRINT_MAC(pEntry->Addr))); if (eapol_len > Elem->MsgLen - LENGTH_802_11 - LENGTH_802_1_H) { DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_ERROR, ("The length of EAPoL packet is invalid \n")); break; } if (((pEapol_packet->ProVer != EAPOL_VER) && (pEapol_packet->ProVer != EAPOL_VER2)) || ((pEapol_packet->KeyDesc.Type != WPA1_KEY_DESC) && (pEapol_packet->KeyDesc.Type != WPA2_KEY_DESC))) { DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_ERROR, ("Key descripter does not match with WPA rule\n")); break; } /* The value 1 shall be used for all EAPOL-Key frames to and from a STA when */ /* neither the group nor pairwise ciphers are CCMP for Key Descriptor 1.*/ if ((pEntry->WepStatus == Ndis802_11Encryption2Enabled) && (peerKeyInfo.KeyDescVer != KEY_DESC_TKIP)) { DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_ERROR, ("Key descripter version not match(TKIP) \n")); break; } /* The value 2 shall be used for all EAPOL-Key frames to and from a STA when */ /* either the pairwise or the group cipher is AES-CCMP for Key Descriptor 2.*/ else if ((pEntry->WepStatus == Ndis802_11Encryption3Enabled) && (peerKeyInfo.KeyDescVer != KEY_DESC_AES)) { DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_ERROR, ("Key descripter version not match(AES) \n")); break; } /* Check if this STA is in class 3 state and the WPA state is started */ if ((pEntry->Sst == SST_ASSOC) && (pEntry->WpaState >= AS_INITPSK)) { /* Check the Key Ack (bit 7) of the Key Information to determine the Authenticator */ /* or not.*/ /* An EAPOL-Key frame that is sent by the Supplicant in response to an EAPOL-*/ /* Key frame from the Authenticator must not have the Ack bit set.*/ if (peerKeyInfo.KeyAck == 1) { /* The frame is snet by Authenticator. */ /* So the Supplicant side shall handle this.*/ if ((peerKeyInfo.Secure == 0) && (peerKeyInfo.Request == 0) && (peerKeyInfo.Error == 0) && (peerKeyInfo.KeyType == PAIRWISEKEY)) { /* Process 1. the message 1 of 4-way HS in WPA or WPA2 */ /* EAPOL-Key(0,0,1,0,P,0,0,ANonce,0,DataKD_M1)*/ /* 2. the message 3 of 4-way HS in WPA */ /* EAPOL-Key(0,1,1,1,P,0,KeyRSC,ANonce,MIC,DataKD_M3)*/ if (peerKeyInfo.KeyMic == 0) PeerPairMsg1Action(pAd, pEntry, Elem); else PeerPairMsg3Action(pAd, pEntry, Elem); } else if ((peerKeyInfo.Secure == 1) && (peerKeyInfo.KeyMic == 1) && (peerKeyInfo.Request == 0) && (peerKeyInfo.Error == 0)) { /* Process 1. the message 3 of 4-way HS in WPA2 */ /* EAPOL-Key(1,1,1,1,P,0,KeyRSC,ANonce,MIC,DataKD_M3)*/ /* 2. the message 1 of group KS in WPA or WPA2*/ /* EAPOL-Key(1,1,1,0,G,0,Key RSC,0, MIC,GTK[N])*/ if (peerKeyInfo.KeyType == PAIRWISEKEY) PeerPairMsg3Action(pAd, pEntry, Elem); else PeerGroupMsg1Action(pAd, pEntry, Elem); } } else { /* The frame is snet by Supplicant. */ /* So the Authenticator side shall handle this.*/ if ((peerKeyInfo.Request == 0) && (peerKeyInfo.Error == 0) && (peerKeyInfo.KeyMic == 1)) { if (peerKeyInfo.Secure == 0 && peerKeyInfo.KeyType == PAIRWISEKEY) { /* EAPOL-Key(0,1,0,0,P,0,0,SNonce,MIC,Data)*/ /* Process 1. message 2 of 4-way HS in WPA or WPA2 */ /* 2. message 4 of 4-way HS in WPA */ if (CONV_ARRARY_TO_UINT16(pEapol_packet->KeyDesc.KeyDataLen) == 0) { PeerPairMsg4Action(pAd, pEntry, Elem); } else { PeerPairMsg2Action(pAd, pEntry, Elem); } } else if (peerKeyInfo.Secure == 1 && peerKeyInfo.KeyType == PAIRWISEKEY) { /* EAPOL-Key(1,1,0,0,P,0,0,0,MIC,0) */ /* Process message 4 of 4-way HS in WPA2*/ PeerPairMsg4Action(pAd, pEntry, Elem); } else if (peerKeyInfo.Secure == 1 && peerKeyInfo.KeyType == GROUPKEY) { /* EAPOL-Key(1,1,0,0,G,0,0,0,MIC,0)*/ /* Process message 2 of Group key HS in WPA or WPA2 */ PeerGroupMsg2Action(pAd, pEntry, &Elem->Msg[LENGTH_802_11], (Elem->MsgLen - LENGTH_802_11)); } } } } }while(FALSE); } /* ======================================================================== Routine Description: Copy frame from waiting queue into relative ring buffer and set appropriate ASIC register to kick hardware encryption before really sent out to air. Arguments: pAd Pointer to our adapter PNDIS_PACKET Pointer to outgoing Ndis frame NumberOfFrag Number of fragment required Return Value: None Note: ======================================================================== */ VOID RTMPToWirelessSta( IN PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd, IN PMAC_TABLE_ENTRY pEntry, IN PUCHAR pHeader802_3, IN UINT HdrLen, IN PUCHAR pData, IN UINT DataLen, IN BOOLEAN bClearFrame) { PNDIS_PACKET pPacket; NDIS_STATUS Status; if ((!pEntry) || (!IS_ENTRY_CLIENT(pEntry) && !IS_ENTRY_APCLI(pEntry) )) return; do { /* build a NDIS packet*/ Status = RTMPAllocateNdisPacket(pAd, &pPacket, pHeader802_3, HdrLen, pData, DataLen); if (Status != NDIS_STATUS_SUCCESS) break; if (bClearFrame) RTMP_SET_PACKET_CLEAR_EAP_FRAME(pPacket, 1); else RTMP_SET_PACKET_CLEAR_EAP_FRAME(pPacket, 0); { RTMP_SET_PACKET_SOURCE(pPacket, PKTSRC_NDIS); RTMP_SET_PACKET_NET_DEVICE_MBSSID(pPacket, MAIN_MBSSID); /* set a default value*/ if(pEntry->apidx != 0) RTMP_SET_PACKET_NET_DEVICE_MBSSID(pPacket, pEntry->apidx); RTMP_SET_PACKET_WCID(pPacket, (UCHAR)pEntry->Aid); RTMP_SET_PACKET_MOREDATA(pPacket, FALSE); } #ifdef CONFIG_STA_SUPPORT IF_DEV_CONFIG_OPMODE_ON_STA(pAd) { /* send out the packet*/ Status = STASendPacket(pAd, pPacket); if (Status == NDIS_STATUS_SUCCESS) { UCHAR Index; /* Dequeue one frame from TxSwQueue0..3 queue and process it*/ /* There are three place calling dequeue for TX ring.*/ /* 1. Here, right after queueing the frame.*/ /* 2. At the end of TxRingTxDone service routine.*/ /* 3. Upon NDIS call RTMPSendPackets*/ if((!RTMP_TEST_FLAG(pAd, fRTMP_ADAPTER_BSS_SCAN_IN_PROGRESS)) && (!RTMP_TEST_FLAG(pAd, fRTMP_ADAPTER_RESET_IN_PROGRESS))) { for(Index = 0; Index < 5; Index ++) if(pAd->TxSwQueue[Index].Number > 0) RTMPDeQueuePacket(pAd, FALSE, Index, MAX_TX_PROCESS); } } } #endif /* CONFIG_STA_SUPPORT */ } while (FALSE); } /* ========================================================================== Description: Check the validity of the received EAPoL frame Return: TRUE if all parameters are OK, FALSE otherwise ========================================================================== */ BOOLEAN PeerWpaMessageSanity( IN PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd, IN PEAPOL_PACKET pMsg, IN ULONG MsgLen, IN UCHAR MsgType, IN MAC_TABLE_ENTRY *pEntry) { UCHAR mic[LEN_KEY_DESC_MIC], digest[80]; /*, KEYDATA[MAX_LEN_OF_RSNIE];*/ UCHAR *KEYDATA = NULL; BOOLEAN bReplayDiff = FALSE; BOOLEAN bWPA2 = FALSE; KEY_INFO EapolKeyInfo; UCHAR GroupKeyIndex = 0; /* allocate memory */ os_alloc_mem(NULL, (UCHAR **)&KEYDATA, MAX_LEN_OF_RSNIE); if (KEYDATA == NULL) { DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_ERROR, ("%s: Allocate memory fail!!!\n", __FUNCTION__)); return FALSE; } NdisZeroMemory(mic, sizeof(mic)); NdisZeroMemory(digest, sizeof(digest)); NdisZeroMemory(KEYDATA, sizeof(KEYDATA)); NdisZeroMemory((PUCHAR)&EapolKeyInfo, sizeof(EapolKeyInfo)); NdisMoveMemory((PUCHAR)&EapolKeyInfo, (PUCHAR)&pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyInfo, sizeof(KEY_INFO)); *((USHORT *)&EapolKeyInfo) = cpu2le16(*((USHORT *)&EapolKeyInfo)); /* Choose WPA2 or not*/ if ((pEntry->AuthMode == Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA2) || (pEntry->AuthMode == Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA2PSK)) bWPA2 = TRUE; /* 0. Check MsgType*/ if ((MsgType > EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_2) || (MsgType < EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_1)) { DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_ERROR, ("The message type is invalid(%d)! \n", MsgType)); goto LabelErr; } /* 1. Replay counter check */ if (MsgType == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_1 || MsgType == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_3 || MsgType == EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_1) /* For supplicant*/ { /* First validate replay counter, only accept message with larger replay counter.*/ /* Let equal pass, some AP start with all zero replay counter*/ UCHAR ZeroReplay[LEN_KEY_DESC_REPLAY]; NdisZeroMemory(ZeroReplay, LEN_KEY_DESC_REPLAY); if ((RTMPCompareMemory(pMsg->KeyDesc.ReplayCounter, pEntry->R_Counter, LEN_KEY_DESC_REPLAY) != 1) && (RTMPCompareMemory(pMsg->KeyDesc.ReplayCounter, ZeroReplay, LEN_KEY_DESC_REPLAY) != 0)) { bReplayDiff = TRUE; } } else if (MsgType == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_2 || MsgType == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_4 || MsgType == EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_2) /* For authenticator*/ { /* check Replay Counter coresponds to MSG from authenticator, otherwise discard*/ if (!NdisEqualMemory(pMsg->KeyDesc.ReplayCounter, pEntry->R_Counter, LEN_KEY_DESC_REPLAY)) { bReplayDiff = TRUE; } } /* Replay Counter different condition*/ if (bReplayDiff) { /* send wireless event - for replay counter different*/ RTMPSendWirelessEvent(pAd, IW_REPLAY_COUNTER_DIFF_EVENT_FLAG, pEntry->Addr, pEntry->apidx, 0); if (MsgType < EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_1) { DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_ERROR, ("Replay Counter Different in pairwise msg %d of 4-way handshake!\n", MsgType)); } else { DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_ERROR, ("Replay Counter Different in group msg %d of 2-way handshake!\n", (MsgType - EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_4))); } hex_dump("Receive replay counter ", pMsg->KeyDesc.ReplayCounter, LEN_KEY_DESC_REPLAY); hex_dump("Current replay counter ", pEntry->R_Counter, LEN_KEY_DESC_REPLAY); goto LabelErr; } /* 2. Verify MIC except Pairwise Msg1*/ if (MsgType != EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_1) { UCHAR rcvd_mic[LEN_KEY_DESC_MIC]; UINT eapol_len = CONV_ARRARY_TO_UINT16(pMsg->Body_Len) + 4; /* Record the received MIC for check later*/ NdisMoveMemory(rcvd_mic, pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyMic, LEN_KEY_DESC_MIC); NdisZeroMemory(pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyMic, LEN_KEY_DESC_MIC); if (EapolKeyInfo.KeyDescVer == KEY_DESC_TKIP) /* TKIP*/ { RT_HMAC_MD5(pEntry->PTK, LEN_PTK_KCK, (PUCHAR)pMsg, eapol_len, mic, MD5_DIGEST_SIZE); } else if (EapolKeyInfo.KeyDescVer == KEY_DESC_AES) /* AES */ { RT_HMAC_SHA1(pEntry->PTK, LEN_PTK_KCK, (PUCHAR)pMsg, eapol_len, digest, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE); NdisMoveMemory(mic, digest, LEN_KEY_DESC_MIC); } if (!NdisEqualMemory(rcvd_mic, mic, LEN_KEY_DESC_MIC)) { /* send wireless event - for MIC different*/ RTMPSendWirelessEvent(pAd, IW_MIC_DIFF_EVENT_FLAG, pEntry->Addr, pEntry->apidx, 0); if (MsgType < EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_1) { DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_ERROR, ("MIC Different in pairwise msg %d of 4-way handshake!\n", MsgType)); } else { DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_ERROR, ("MIC Different in group msg %d of 2-way handshake!\n", (MsgType - EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_4))); } hex_dump("Received MIC", rcvd_mic, LEN_KEY_DESC_MIC); hex_dump("Desired MIC", mic, LEN_KEY_DESC_MIC); goto LabelErr; } } /* 1. Decrypt the Key Data field if GTK is included.*/ /* 2. Extract the context of the Key Data field if it exist. */ /* The field in pairwise_msg_2_WPA1(WPA2) & pairwise_msg_3_WPA1 is clear.*/ /* The field in group_msg_1_WPA1(WPA2) & pairwise_msg_3_WPA2 is encrypted.*/ if (CONV_ARRARY_TO_UINT16(pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyDataLen) > 0) { /* Decrypt this field */ if ((MsgType == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_3 && bWPA2) || (MsgType == EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_1)) { if( (EapolKeyInfo.KeyDescVer == KEY_DESC_AES)) { UINT aes_unwrap_len = 0; /* AES */ AES_Key_Unwrap(pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyData, CONV_ARRARY_TO_UINT16(pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyDataLen), &pEntry->PTK[LEN_PTK_KCK], LEN_PTK_KEK, KEYDATA, &aes_unwrap_len); SET_UINT16_TO_ARRARY(pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyDataLen, aes_unwrap_len); } else { TKIP_GTK_KEY_UNWRAP(&pEntry->PTK[LEN_PTK_KCK], pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyIv, pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyData, CONV_ARRARY_TO_UINT16(pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyDataLen), KEYDATA); } if (!bWPA2 && (MsgType == EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_1)) GroupKeyIndex = EapolKeyInfo.KeyIndex; } else if ((MsgType == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_2) || (MsgType == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_3 && !bWPA2)) { NdisMoveMemory(KEYDATA, pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyData, CONV_ARRARY_TO_UINT16(pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyDataLen)); } else { goto LabelOK; } /* Parse Key Data field to */ /* 1. verify RSN IE for pairwise_msg_2_WPA1(WPA2) ,pairwise_msg_3_WPA1(WPA2)*/ /* 2. verify KDE format for pairwise_msg_3_WPA2, group_msg_1_WPA2*/ /* 3. update shared key for pairwise_msg_3_WPA2, group_msg_1_WPA1(WPA2)*/ if (!RTMPParseEapolKeyData(pAd, KEYDATA, CONV_ARRARY_TO_UINT16(pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyDataLen), GroupKeyIndex, MsgType, bWPA2, pEntry)) { goto LabelErr; } } LabelOK: if (KEYDATA != NULL) os_free_mem(NULL, KEYDATA); return TRUE; LabelErr: if (KEYDATA != NULL) os_free_mem(NULL, KEYDATA); return FALSE; } /* ========================================================================== Description: This is a function to initilize 4-way handshake Return: ========================================================================== */ VOID WPAStart4WayHS( IN PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd, IN MAC_TABLE_ENTRY *pEntry, IN ULONG TimeInterval) { UCHAR Header802_3[14]; UCHAR *mpool; PEAPOL_PACKET pEapolFrame; PUINT8 pBssid = NULL; UCHAR group_cipher = Ndis802_11WEPDisabled; #ifdef CONFIG_STA_SUPPORT #endif /* CONFIG_STA_SUPPORT */ DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("===> WPAStart4WayHS\n")); if (RTMP_TEST_FLAG(pAd, fRTMP_ADAPTER_RESET_IN_PROGRESS | fRTMP_ADAPTER_HALT_IN_PROGRESS)) { DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_ERROR, ("[ERROR]WPAStart4WayHS : The interface is closed...\n")); return; } if (pBssid == NULL) { DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_ERROR, ("[ERROR]WPAStart4WayHS : No corresponding Authenticator.\n")); return; } /* Check the status*/ if ((pEntry->WpaState > AS_PTKSTART) || (pEntry->WpaState < AS_INITPMK)) { DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_ERROR, ("[ERROR]WPAStart4WayHS : Not expect calling\n")); return; } /* Increment replay counter by 1*/ ADD_ONE_To_64BIT_VAR(pEntry->R_Counter); /* Randomly generate ANonce */ GenRandom(pAd, (UCHAR *)pBssid, pEntry->ANonce); /* Allocate memory for output*/ os_alloc_mem(NULL, (PUCHAR *)&mpool, TX_EAPOL_BUFFER); if (mpool == NULL) { DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_ERROR, ("!!!%s : no memory!!!\n", __FUNCTION__)); return; } pEapolFrame = (PEAPOL_PACKET)mpool; NdisZeroMemory(pEapolFrame, TX_EAPOL_BUFFER); /* Construct EAPoL message - Pairwise Msg 1*/ /* EAPOL-Key(0,0,1,0,P,0,0,ANonce,0,DataKD_M1) */ ConstructEapolMsg(pEntry, group_cipher, EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_1, 0, /* Default key index*/ pEntry->ANonce, NULL, /* TxRSC*/ NULL, /* GTK*/ NULL, /* RSNIE*/ 0, /* RSNIE length */ pEapolFrame); /* Make outgoing frame*/ MAKE_802_3_HEADER(Header802_3, pEntry->Addr, pBssid, EAPOL); RTMPToWirelessSta(pAd, pEntry, Header802_3, LENGTH_802_3, (PUCHAR)pEapolFrame, CONV_ARRARY_TO_UINT16(pEapolFrame->Body_Len) + 4, (pEntry->PortSecured == WPA_802_1X_PORT_SECURED) ? FALSE : TRUE); /* Trigger Retry Timer*/ RTMPModTimer(&pEntry->RetryTimer, TimeInterval); /* Update State*/ pEntry->WpaState = AS_PTKSTART; os_free_mem(NULL, mpool); DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("<=== WPAStart4WayHS: send Msg1 of 4-way \n")); } /* ======================================================================== Routine Description: Process Pairwise key Msg-1 of 4-way handshaking and send Msg-2 Arguments: pAd Pointer to our adapter Elem Message body Return Value: None Note: ======================================================================== */ VOID PeerPairMsg1Action( IN PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd, IN MAC_TABLE_ENTRY *pEntry, IN MLME_QUEUE_ELEM *Elem) { UCHAR PTK[80]; UCHAR Header802_3[14]; PEAPOL_PACKET pMsg1; UINT MsgLen; UCHAR *mpool; PEAPOL_PACKET pEapolFrame; PUINT8 pCurrentAddr = NULL; PUINT8 pmk_ptr = NULL; UCHAR group_cipher = Ndis802_11WEPDisabled; PUINT8 rsnie_ptr = NULL; UCHAR rsnie_len = 0; DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("===> PeerPairMsg1Action \n")); if ((!pEntry) || (!IS_ENTRY_CLIENT(pEntry) && !IS_ENTRY_APCLI(pEntry))) return; if (Elem->MsgLen < (LENGTH_802_11 + LENGTH_802_1_H + LENGTH_EAPOL_H + MIN_LEN_OF_EAPOL_KEY_MSG)) return; #ifdef CONFIG_STA_SUPPORT IF_DEV_CONFIG_OPMODE_ON_STA(pAd) { { pCurrentAddr = pAd->CurrentAddress; pmk_ptr = pAd->StaCfg.PMK; group_cipher = pAd->StaCfg.GroupCipher; rsnie_ptr = pAd->StaCfg.RSN_IE; rsnie_len = pAd->StaCfg.RSNIE_Len; } } #endif /* CONFIG_STA_SUPPORT */ if (pCurrentAddr == NULL) return; /* Store the received frame*/ pMsg1 = (PEAPOL_PACKET) &Elem->Msg[LENGTH_802_11 + LENGTH_802_1_H]; MsgLen = Elem->MsgLen - LENGTH_802_11 - LENGTH_802_1_H; /* Sanity Check peer Pairwise message 1 - Replay Counter*/ if (PeerWpaMessageSanity(pAd, pMsg1, MsgLen, EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_1, pEntry) == FALSE) return; /* Store Replay counter, it will use to verify message 3 and construct message 2*/ NdisMoveMemory(pEntry->R_Counter, pMsg1->KeyDesc.ReplayCounter, LEN_KEY_DESC_REPLAY); /* Store ANonce*/ NdisMoveMemory(pEntry->ANonce, pMsg1->KeyDesc.KeyNonce, LEN_KEY_DESC_NONCE); /* Generate random SNonce*/ GenRandom(pAd, (UCHAR *)pCurrentAddr, pEntry->SNonce); { /* Calculate PTK(ANonce, SNonce)*/ WpaDerivePTK(pAd, pmk_ptr, pEntry->ANonce, pEntry->Addr, pEntry->SNonce, pCurrentAddr, PTK, LEN_PTK); /* Save key to PTK entry*/ NdisMoveMemory(pEntry->PTK, PTK, LEN_PTK); } /* Update WpaState*/ pEntry->WpaState = AS_PTKINIT_NEGOTIATING; /* Allocate memory for output*/ os_alloc_mem(NULL, (PUCHAR *)&mpool, TX_EAPOL_BUFFER); if (mpool == NULL) { DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_ERROR, ("!!!%s : no memory!!!\n", __FUNCTION__)); return; } pEapolFrame = (PEAPOL_PACKET)mpool; NdisZeroMemory(pEapolFrame, TX_EAPOL_BUFFER); /* Construct EAPoL message - Pairwise Msg 2*/ /* EAPOL-Key(0,1,0,0,P,0,0,SNonce,MIC,DataKD_M2)*/ ConstructEapolMsg(pEntry, group_cipher, EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_2, 0, /* DefaultKeyIdx*/ pEntry->SNonce, NULL, /* TxRsc*/ NULL, /* GTK*/ (UCHAR *)rsnie_ptr, rsnie_len, pEapolFrame); /* Make outgoing frame*/ MAKE_802_3_HEADER(Header802_3, pEntry->Addr, pCurrentAddr, EAPOL); RTMPToWirelessSta(pAd, pEntry, Header802_3, sizeof(Header802_3), (PUCHAR)pEapolFrame, CONV_ARRARY_TO_UINT16(pEapolFrame->Body_Len) + 4, TRUE); os_free_mem(NULL, mpool); DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("<=== PeerPairMsg1Action: send Msg2 of 4-way \n")); } /* ========================================================================== Description: When receiving the second packet of 4-way pairwisekey handshake. Return: ========================================================================== */ VOID PeerPairMsg2Action( IN PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd, IN MAC_TABLE_ENTRY *pEntry, IN MLME_QUEUE_ELEM *Elem) { UCHAR PTK[80]; BOOLEAN Cancelled; PHEADER_802_11 pHeader; UCHAR *mpool; PEAPOL_PACKET pEapolFrame; PEAPOL_PACKET pMsg2; UINT MsgLen; UCHAR Header802_3[LENGTH_802_3]; UCHAR TxTsc[6]; PUINT8 pBssid = NULL; PUINT8 pmk_ptr = NULL; PUINT8 gtk_ptr = NULL; UCHAR default_key = 0; UCHAR group_cipher = Ndis802_11WEPDisabled; PUINT8 rsnie_ptr = NULL; UCHAR rsnie_len = 0; DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("===> PeerPairMsg2Action \n")); if ((!pEntry) || !IS_ENTRY_CLIENT(pEntry)) return; if (Elem->MsgLen < (LENGTH_802_11 + LENGTH_802_1_H + LENGTH_EAPOL_H + MIN_LEN_OF_EAPOL_KEY_MSG)) return; /* check Entry in valid State*/ if (pEntry->WpaState < AS_PTKSTART) return; /* pointer to 802.11 header*/ pHeader = (PHEADER_802_11)Elem->Msg; /* skip 802.11_header(24-byte) and LLC_header(8) */ pMsg2 = (PEAPOL_PACKET)&Elem->Msg[LENGTH_802_11 + LENGTH_802_1_H]; MsgLen = Elem->MsgLen - LENGTH_802_11 - LENGTH_802_1_H; /* Store SNonce*/ NdisMoveMemory(pEntry->SNonce, pMsg2->KeyDesc.KeyNonce, LEN_KEY_DESC_NONCE); { /* Derive PTK*/ WpaDerivePTK(pAd, (UCHAR *)pmk_ptr, pEntry->ANonce, /* ANONCE*/ (UCHAR *)pBssid, pEntry->SNonce, /* SNONCE*/ pEntry->Addr, PTK, LEN_PTK); NdisMoveMemory(pEntry->PTK, PTK, LEN_PTK); } /* Sanity Check peer Pairwise message 2 - Replay Counter, MIC, RSNIE*/ if (PeerWpaMessageSanity(pAd, pMsg2, MsgLen, EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_2, pEntry) == FALSE) return; do { /* Allocate memory for input*/ os_alloc_mem(NULL, (PUCHAR *)&mpool, TX_EAPOL_BUFFER); if (mpool == NULL) { DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_ERROR, ("!!!%s : no memory!!!\n", __FUNCTION__)); return; } pEapolFrame = (PEAPOL_PACKET)mpool; NdisZeroMemory(pEapolFrame, TX_EAPOL_BUFFER); /* delete retry timer*/ RTMPCancelTimer(&pEntry->RetryTimer, &Cancelled); /* Change state*/ pEntry->WpaState = AS_PTKINIT_NEGOTIATING; /* Increment replay counter by 1*/ ADD_ONE_To_64BIT_VAR(pEntry->R_Counter); /* Construct EAPoL message - Pairwise Msg 3*/ ConstructEapolMsg(pEntry, group_cipher, EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_3, default_key, pEntry->ANonce, TxTsc, (UCHAR *)gtk_ptr, (UCHAR *)rsnie_ptr, rsnie_len, pEapolFrame); /* Make outgoing frame*/ MAKE_802_3_HEADER(Header802_3, pEntry->Addr, pBssid, EAPOL); RTMPToWirelessSta(pAd, pEntry, Header802_3, LENGTH_802_3, (PUCHAR)pEapolFrame, CONV_ARRARY_TO_UINT16(pEapolFrame->Body_Len) + 4, (pEntry->PortSecured == WPA_802_1X_PORT_SECURED) ? FALSE : TRUE); pEntry->ReTryCounter = PEER_MSG3_RETRY_TIMER_CTR; RTMPSetTimer(&pEntry->RetryTimer, PEER_MSG3_RETRY_EXEC_INTV); /* Update State*/ pEntry->WpaState = AS_PTKINIT_NEGOTIATING; os_free_mem(NULL, mpool); }while(FALSE); DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("<=== PeerPairMsg2Action: send Msg3 of 4-way \n")); } /* ======================================================================== Routine Description: Process Pairwise key Msg 3 of 4-way handshaking and send Msg 4 Arguments: pAd Pointer to our adapter Elem Message body Return Value: None Note: ======================================================================== */ VOID PeerPairMsg3Action( IN PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd, IN MAC_TABLE_ENTRY *pEntry, IN MLME_QUEUE_ELEM *Elem) { PHEADER_802_11 pHeader; UCHAR Header802_3[14]; UCHAR *mpool; PEAPOL_PACKET pEapolFrame; PEAPOL_PACKET pMsg3; UINT MsgLen; PUINT8 pCurrentAddr = NULL; UCHAR group_cipher = Ndis802_11WEPDisabled; DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("===> PeerPairMsg3Action \n")); if ((!pEntry) || (!IS_ENTRY_CLIENT(pEntry) && !IS_ENTRY_APCLI(pEntry))) return; if (Elem->MsgLen < (LENGTH_802_11 + LENGTH_802_1_H + LENGTH_EAPOL_H + MIN_LEN_OF_EAPOL_KEY_MSG)) return; #ifdef CONFIG_STA_SUPPORT IF_DEV_CONFIG_OPMODE_ON_STA(pAd) { { pCurrentAddr = pAd->CurrentAddress; group_cipher = pAd->StaCfg.GroupCipher; } } #endif /* CONFIG_STA_SUPPORT */ if (pCurrentAddr == NULL) return; /* Record 802.11 header & the received EAPOL packet Msg3*/ pHeader = (PHEADER_802_11) Elem->Msg; pMsg3 = (PEAPOL_PACKET) &Elem->Msg[LENGTH_802_11 + LENGTH_802_1_H]; MsgLen = Elem->MsgLen - LENGTH_802_11 - LENGTH_802_1_H; /* Sanity Check peer Pairwise message 3 - Replay Counter, MIC, RSNIE*/ if (PeerWpaMessageSanity(pAd, pMsg3, MsgLen, EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_3, pEntry) == FALSE) return; /* Save Replay counter, it will use construct message 4*/ NdisMoveMemory(pEntry->R_Counter, pMsg3->KeyDesc.ReplayCounter, LEN_KEY_DESC_REPLAY); /* Double check ANonce*/ if (!NdisEqualMemory(pEntry->ANonce, pMsg3->KeyDesc.KeyNonce, LEN_KEY_DESC_NONCE)) { return; } /* Allocate memory for output*/ os_alloc_mem(NULL, (PUCHAR *)&mpool, TX_EAPOL_BUFFER); if (mpool == NULL) { DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_ERROR, ("!!!%s : no memory!!!\n", __FUNCTION__)); return; } pEapolFrame = (PEAPOL_PACKET)mpool; NdisZeroMemory(pEapolFrame, TX_EAPOL_BUFFER); /* Construct EAPoL message - Pairwise Msg 4*/ ConstructEapolMsg(pEntry, group_cipher, EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_4, 0, /* group key index not used in message 4*/ NULL, /* Nonce not used in message 4*/ NULL, /* TxRSC not used in message 4*/ NULL, /* GTK not used in message 4*/ NULL, /* RSN IE not used in message 4*/ 0, pEapolFrame); /* Update WpaState*/ pEntry->WpaState = AS_PTKINITDONE; /* Update pairwise key */ #ifdef CONFIG_STA_SUPPORT IF_DEV_CONFIG_OPMODE_ON_STA(pAd) { { NdisMoveMemory(pAd->StaCfg.PTK, pEntry->PTK, LEN_PTK); WPAInstallPairwiseKey(pAd, BSS0, pEntry, FALSE); NdisMoveMemory(&pAd->SharedKey[BSS0][0], &pEntry->PairwiseKey, sizeof(CIPHER_KEY)); } } #endif /* CONFIG_STA_SUPPORT */ /* open 802.1x port control and privacy filter*/ if (pEntry->AuthMode == Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA2PSK || pEntry->AuthMode == Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA2) { pEntry->PortSecured = WPA_802_1X_PORT_SECURED; pEntry->PrivacyFilter = Ndis802_11PrivFilterAcceptAll; #ifdef CONFIG_STA_SUPPORT STA_PORT_SECURED(pAd); #endif /* CONFIG_STA_SUPPORT */ DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("PeerPairMsg3Action: AuthMode(%s) PairwiseCipher(%s) GroupCipher(%s) \n", GetAuthMode(pEntry->AuthMode), GetEncryptType(pEntry->WepStatus), GetEncryptType(group_cipher))); } else { } /* Init 802.3 header and send out*/ MAKE_802_3_HEADER(Header802_3, pEntry->Addr, pCurrentAddr, EAPOL); RTMPToWirelessSta(pAd, pEntry, Header802_3, sizeof(Header802_3), (PUCHAR)pEapolFrame, CONV_ARRARY_TO_UINT16(pEapolFrame->Body_Len) + 4, TRUE); os_free_mem(NULL, mpool); DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("<=== PeerPairMsg3Action: send Msg4 of 4-way \n")); } /* ========================================================================== Description: When receiving the last packet of 4-way pairwisekey handshake. Initilize 2-way groupkey handshake following. Return: ========================================================================== */ VOID PeerPairMsg4Action( IN PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd, IN MAC_TABLE_ENTRY *pEntry, IN MLME_QUEUE_ELEM *Elem) { PEAPOL_PACKET pMsg4; PHEADER_802_11 pHeader; UINT MsgLen; BOOLEAN Cancelled; UCHAR group_cipher = Ndis802_11WEPDisabled; DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("===> PeerPairMsg4Action\n")); do { if ((!pEntry) || !IS_ENTRY_CLIENT(pEntry)) break; if (Elem->MsgLen < (LENGTH_802_11 + LENGTH_802_1_H + LENGTH_EAPOL_H + MIN_LEN_OF_EAPOL_KEY_MSG ) ) break; if (pEntry->WpaState < AS_PTKINIT_NEGOTIATING) break; /* pointer to 802.11 header*/ pHeader = (PHEADER_802_11)Elem->Msg; /* skip 802.11_header(24-byte) and LLC_header(8) */ pMsg4 = (PEAPOL_PACKET)&Elem->Msg[LENGTH_802_11 + LENGTH_802_1_H]; MsgLen = Elem->MsgLen - LENGTH_802_11 - LENGTH_802_1_H; /* Sanity Check peer Pairwise message 4 - Replay Counter, MIC*/ if (PeerWpaMessageSanity(pAd, pMsg4, MsgLen, EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_4, pEntry) == FALSE) break; /* 3. Install pairwise key */ WPAInstallPairwiseKey(pAd, pEntry->apidx, pEntry, TRUE); /* 4. upgrade state */ pEntry->PrivacyFilter = Ndis802_11PrivFilterAcceptAll; pEntry->WpaState = AS_PTKINITDONE; pEntry->PortSecured = WPA_802_1X_PORT_SECURED; if (pEntry->AuthMode == Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA2 || pEntry->AuthMode == Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA2PSK) { pEntry->GTKState = REKEY_ESTABLISHED; RTMPCancelTimer(&pEntry->RetryTimer, &Cancelled); /* send wireless event - for set key done WPA2*/ RTMPSendWirelessEvent(pAd, IW_SET_KEY_DONE_WPA2_EVENT_FLAG, pEntry->Addr, pEntry->apidx, 0); DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_OFF, ("AP SETKEYS DONE - WPA2, AuthMode(%d)=%s, WepStatus(%d)=%s, GroupWepStatus(%d)=%s\n\n", pEntry->AuthMode, GetAuthMode(pEntry->AuthMode), pEntry->WepStatus, GetEncryptType(pEntry->WepStatus), group_cipher, GetEncryptType(group_cipher))); } else { /* 5. init Group 2-way handshake if necessary.*/ WPAStart2WayGroupHS(pAd, pEntry); pEntry->ReTryCounter = GROUP_MSG1_RETRY_TIMER_CTR; RTMPModTimer(&pEntry->RetryTimer, PEER_MSG3_RETRY_EXEC_INTV); } }while(FALSE); } /* ========================================================================== Description: This is a function to send the first packet of 2-way groupkey handshake Return: ========================================================================== */ VOID WPAStart2WayGroupHS( IN PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd, IN MAC_TABLE_ENTRY *pEntry) { UCHAR Header802_3[14]; UCHAR TxTsc[6]; UCHAR *mpool; PEAPOL_PACKET pEapolFrame; UCHAR group_cipher = Ndis802_11WEPDisabled; UCHAR default_key = 0; PUINT8 gnonce_ptr = NULL; PUINT8 gtk_ptr = NULL; PUINT8 pBssid = NULL; DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("===> WPAStart2WayGroupHS\n")); if ((!pEntry) || !IS_ENTRY_CLIENT(pEntry)) return; /* Allocate memory for output*/ os_alloc_mem(NULL, (PUCHAR *)&mpool, TX_EAPOL_BUFFER); if (mpool == NULL) { DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_ERROR, ("!!!%s : no memory!!!\n", __FUNCTION__)); return; } pEapolFrame = (PEAPOL_PACKET)mpool; NdisZeroMemory(pEapolFrame, TX_EAPOL_BUFFER); /* Increment replay counter by 1*/ ADD_ONE_To_64BIT_VAR(pEntry->R_Counter); /* Construct EAPoL message - Group Msg 1*/ ConstructEapolMsg(pEntry, group_cipher, EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_1, default_key, (UCHAR *)gnonce_ptr, TxTsc, (UCHAR *)gtk_ptr, NULL, 0, pEapolFrame); /* Make outgoing frame*/ MAKE_802_3_HEADER(Header802_3, pEntry->Addr, pBssid, EAPOL); RTMPToWirelessSta(pAd, pEntry, Header802_3, LENGTH_802_3, (PUCHAR)pEapolFrame, CONV_ARRARY_TO_UINT16(pEapolFrame->Body_Len) + 4, FALSE); os_free_mem(NULL, mpool); DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("<=== WPAStart2WayGroupHS : send out Group Message 1 \n")); return; } /* ======================================================================== Routine Description: Process Group key 2-way handshaking Arguments: pAd Pointer to our adapter Elem Message body Return Value: None Note: ======================================================================== */ VOID PeerGroupMsg1Action( IN PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd, IN MAC_TABLE_ENTRY *pEntry, IN MLME_QUEUE_ELEM *Elem) { UCHAR Header802_3[14]; UCHAR *mpool; PEAPOL_PACKET pEapolFrame; PEAPOL_PACKET pGroup; UINT MsgLen; UCHAR default_key = 0; UCHAR group_cipher = Ndis802_11WEPDisabled; PUINT8 pCurrentAddr = NULL; #ifdef APCLI_SUPPORT BOOLEAN Cancelled; #endif /* APCLI_SUPPORT */ DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("===> PeerGroupMsg1Action \n")); if ((!pEntry) || (!IS_ENTRY_CLIENT(pEntry) && !IS_ENTRY_APCLI(pEntry))) return; #ifdef CONFIG_STA_SUPPORT IF_DEV_CONFIG_OPMODE_ON_STA(pAd) { pCurrentAddr = pAd->CurrentAddress; group_cipher = pAd->StaCfg.GroupCipher; default_key = pAd->StaCfg.DefaultKeyId; } #endif /* CONFIG_STA_SUPPORT */ if (pCurrentAddr == NULL) return; /* Process Group Message 1 frame. skip 802.11 header(24) & LLC_SNAP header(8)*/ pGroup = (PEAPOL_PACKET) &Elem->Msg[LENGTH_802_11 + LENGTH_802_1_H]; MsgLen = Elem->MsgLen - LENGTH_802_11 - LENGTH_802_1_H; /* Sanity Check peer group message 1 - Replay Counter, MIC, RSNIE*/ if (PeerWpaMessageSanity(pAd, pGroup, MsgLen, EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_1, pEntry) == FALSE) return; /* delete retry timer*/ /* Save Replay counter, it will use to construct message 2*/ NdisMoveMemory(pEntry->R_Counter, pGroup->KeyDesc.ReplayCounter, LEN_KEY_DESC_REPLAY); /* Allocate memory for output*/ os_alloc_mem(NULL, (PUCHAR *)&mpool, TX_EAPOL_BUFFER); if (mpool == NULL) { DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_ERROR, ("!!!%s : no memory!!!\n", __FUNCTION__)); return; } pEapolFrame = (PEAPOL_PACKET)mpool; NdisZeroMemory(pEapolFrame, TX_EAPOL_BUFFER); /* Construct EAPoL message - Group Msg 2*/ ConstructEapolMsg(pEntry, group_cipher, EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_2, default_key, NULL, /* Nonce not used*/ NULL, /* TxRSC not used*/ NULL, /* GTK not used*/ NULL, /* RSN IE not used*/ 0, pEapolFrame); /* open 802.1x port control and privacy filter*/ pEntry->PortSecured = WPA_802_1X_PORT_SECURED; pEntry->PrivacyFilter = Ndis802_11PrivFilterAcceptAll; #ifdef CONFIG_STA_SUPPORT STA_PORT_SECURED(pAd); #endif /* CONFIG_STA_SUPPORT */ DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("PeerGroupMsg1Action: AuthMode(%s) PairwiseCipher(%s) GroupCipher(%s) \n", GetAuthMode(pEntry->AuthMode), GetEncryptType(pEntry->WepStatus), GetEncryptType(group_cipher))); /* init header and Fill Packet and send Msg 2 to authenticator */ MAKE_802_3_HEADER(Header802_3, pEntry->Addr, pCurrentAddr, EAPOL); #ifdef CONFIG_STA_SUPPORT if ((pAd->OpMode == OPMODE_STA) && INFRA_ON(pAd) && OPSTATUS_TEST_FLAG(pAd, fOP_STATUS_MEDIA_STATE_CONNECTED) && RTMP_TEST_FLAG(pAd, fRTMP_ADAPTER_BSS_SCAN_IN_PROGRESS) && (pAd->MlmeAux.Channel == pAd->CommonCfg.Channel) ) { /* Now stop the scanning and need to send the rekey packet out */ pAd->MlmeAux.Channel = 0; } #endif /* CONFIG_STA_SUPPORT */ RTMPToWirelessSta(pAd, pEntry, Header802_3, sizeof(Header802_3), (PUCHAR)pEapolFrame, CONV_ARRARY_TO_UINT16(pEapolFrame->Body_Len) + 4, FALSE); os_free_mem(NULL, mpool); DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("<=== PeerGroupMsg1Action: send group message 2\n")); } VOID EnqueueStartForPSKExec( IN PVOID SystemSpecific1, IN PVOID FunctionContext, IN PVOID SystemSpecific2, IN PVOID SystemSpecific3) { MAC_TABLE_ENTRY *pEntry = (PMAC_TABLE_ENTRY) FunctionContext; if ((pEntry) && IS_ENTRY_CLIENT(pEntry) && (pEntry->WpaState < AS_PTKSTART)) { PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd = (PRTMP_ADAPTER)pEntry->pAd; switch (pEntry->EnqueueEapolStartTimerRunning) { case EAPOL_START_PSK: DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("Enqueue EAPoL-Start-PSK for sta(%02x:%02x:%02x:%02x:%02x:%02x) \n", PRINT_MAC(pEntry->Addr))); MlmeEnqueue(pAd, WPA_STATE_MACHINE, MT2_EAPOLStart, 6, &pEntry->Addr, 0); break; default: break; } } pEntry->EnqueueEapolStartTimerRunning = EAPOL_START_DISABLE; } VOID MlmeDeAuthAction( IN PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd, IN MAC_TABLE_ENTRY *pEntry, IN USHORT Reason, IN BOOLEAN bDataFrameFirst) { PUCHAR pOutBuffer = NULL; ULONG FrameLen = 0; HEADER_802_11 DeAuthHdr; NDIS_STATUS NStatus; if (pEntry) { /* Send out a Deauthentication request frame*/ NStatus = MlmeAllocateMemory(pAd, &pOutBuffer); if (NStatus != NDIS_STATUS_SUCCESS) return; /* send wireless event - for send disassication */ RTMPSendWirelessEvent(pAd, IW_DEAUTH_EVENT_FLAG, pEntry->Addr, pEntry->apidx, 0); DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("Send DEAUTH frame with ReasonCode(%d) to %02x:%02x:%02x:%02x:%02x:%02x \n",Reason, PRINT_MAC(pEntry->Addr))); #ifdef CONFIG_STA_SUPPORT IF_DEV_CONFIG_OPMODE_ON_STA(pAd) { MgtMacHeaderInit(pAd, &DeAuthHdr, SUBTYPE_DEAUTH, 0, pEntry->Addr, pAd->CommonCfg.Bssid); } #endif /* CONFIG_STA_SUPPORT */ MakeOutgoingFrame(pOutBuffer, &FrameLen, sizeof(HEADER_802_11), &DeAuthHdr, 2, &Reason, END_OF_ARGS); if (bDataFrameFirst) MiniportMMRequest(pAd, MGMT_USE_QUEUE_FLAG, pOutBuffer, FrameLen); else MiniportMMRequest(pAd, 0, pOutBuffer, FrameLen); MlmeFreeMemory(pAd, pOutBuffer); /* ApLogEvent(pAd, pEntry->Addr, EVENT_DISASSOCIATED);*/ MacTableDeleteEntry(pAd, pEntry->Aid, pEntry->Addr); } } /* ========================================================================== Description: When receiving the last packet of 2-way groupkey handshake. Return: ========================================================================== */ VOID PeerGroupMsg2Action( IN PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd, IN MAC_TABLE_ENTRY *pEntry, IN VOID *Msg, IN UINT MsgLen) { UINT Len; PUCHAR pData; BOOLEAN Cancelled; PEAPOL_PACKET pMsg2; UCHAR group_cipher = Ndis802_11WEPDisabled; DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("===> PeerGroupMsg2Action \n")); if ((!pEntry) || !IS_ENTRY_CLIENT(pEntry)) return; if (MsgLen < (LENGTH_802_1_H + LENGTH_EAPOL_H + MIN_LEN_OF_EAPOL_KEY_MSG)) return; if (pEntry->WpaState != AS_PTKINITDONE) return; do { pData = (PUCHAR)Msg; pMsg2 = (PEAPOL_PACKET) (pData + LENGTH_802_1_H); Len = MsgLen - LENGTH_802_1_H; /* Sanity Check peer group message 2 - Replay Counter, MIC*/ if (PeerWpaMessageSanity(pAd, pMsg2, Len, EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_2, pEntry) == FALSE) break; /* 3. upgrade state*/ RTMPCancelTimer(&pEntry->RetryTimer, &Cancelled); pEntry->GTKState = REKEY_ESTABLISHED; if ((pEntry->AuthMode == Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA2) || (pEntry->AuthMode == Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA2PSK)) { /* send wireless event - for set key done WPA2*/ RTMPSendWirelessEvent(pAd, IW_SET_KEY_DONE_WPA2_EVENT_FLAG, pEntry->Addr, pEntry->apidx, 0); DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_OFF, ("AP SETKEYS DONE - WPA2, AuthMode(%d)=%s, WepStatus(%d)=%s, GroupWepStatus(%d)=%s\n\n", pEntry->AuthMode, GetAuthMode(pEntry->AuthMode), pEntry->WepStatus, GetEncryptType(pEntry->WepStatus), group_cipher, GetEncryptType(group_cipher))); } else { /* send wireless event - for set key done WPA*/ RTMPSendWirelessEvent(pAd, IW_SET_KEY_DONE_WPA1_EVENT_FLAG, pEntry->Addr, pEntry->apidx, 0); DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_OFF, ("AP SETKEYS DONE - WPA1, AuthMode(%d)=%s, WepStatus(%d)=%s, GroupWepStatus(%d)=%s\n\n", pEntry->AuthMode, GetAuthMode(pEntry->AuthMode), pEntry->WepStatus, GetEncryptType(pEntry->WepStatus), group_cipher, GetEncryptType(group_cipher))); } }while(FALSE); } /* ======================================================================== Routine Description: Classify WPA EAP message type Arguments: EAPType Value of EAP message type MsgType Internal Message definition for MLME state machine Return Value: TRUE Found appropriate message type FALSE No appropriate message type IRQL = DISPATCH_LEVEL Note: All these constants are defined in wpa_cmm.h For supplicant, there is only EAPOL Key message avaliable ======================================================================== */ BOOLEAN WpaMsgTypeSubst( IN UCHAR EAPType, OUT INT *MsgType) { switch (EAPType) { case EAPPacket: *MsgType = MT2_EAPPacket; break; case EAPOLStart: *MsgType = MT2_EAPOLStart; break; case EAPOLLogoff: *MsgType = MT2_EAPOLLogoff; break; case EAPOLKey: *MsgType = MT2_EAPOLKey; break; case EAPOLASFAlert: *MsgType = MT2_EAPOLASFAlert; break; default: return FALSE; } return TRUE; } /** * inc_iv_byte - Increment arbitrary length byte array * @counter: Pointer to byte array * @len: Length of the counter in bytes * * This function increments the least byte of the counter by one and continues * rolling over to more significant bytes if the byte was incremented from * 0xff to 0x00. */ void inc_iv_byte(UCHAR *iv, UINT len, UINT cnt) { int pos = 0; int carry = 0; UCHAR pre_iv; while (pos < len) { pre_iv = iv[pos]; if (carry == 1) iv[pos] ++; else iv[pos] += cnt; if (iv[pos] > pre_iv) break; carry = 1; pos++; } if (pos >= len) DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_WARN, ("!!! inc_iv_byte overflow !!!\n")); } /* ======================================================================== Routine Description: The pseudo-random function(PRF) that hashes various inputs to derive a pseudo-random value. To add liveness to the pseudo-random value, a nonce should be one of the inputs. It is used to generate PTK, GTK or some specific random value. Arguments: UCHAR *key, - the key material for HMAC_SHA1 use INT key_len - the length of key UCHAR *prefix - a prefix label INT prefix_len - the length of the label UCHAR *data - a specific data with variable length INT data_len - the length of a specific data INT len - the output lenght Return Value: UCHAR *output - the calculated result Note: 802.11i-2004 Annex H.3 ======================================================================== */ VOID PRF( IN UCHAR *key, IN INT key_len, IN UCHAR *prefix, IN INT prefix_len, IN UCHAR *data, IN INT data_len, OUT UCHAR *output, IN INT len) { INT i; UCHAR *input; INT currentindex = 0; INT total_len; /* Allocate memory for input*/ os_alloc_mem(NULL, (PUCHAR *)&input, 1024); if (input == NULL) { DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_ERROR, ("!!!PRF: no memory!!!\n")); return; } /* Generate concatenation input*/ NdisMoveMemory(input, prefix, prefix_len); /* Concatenate a single octet containing 0*/ input[prefix_len] = 0; /* Concatenate specific data*/ NdisMoveMemory(&input[prefix_len + 1], data, data_len); total_len = prefix_len + 1 + data_len; /* Concatenate a single octet containing 0*/ /* This octet shall be update later*/ input[total_len] = 0; total_len++; /* Iterate to calculate the result by hmac-sha-1*/ /* Then concatenate to last result*/ for (i = 0; i < (len + 19) / 20; i++) { RT_HMAC_SHA1(key, key_len, input, total_len, &output[currentindex], SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE); currentindex += 20; /* update the last octet */ input[total_len - 1]++; } os_free_mem(NULL, input); } /* * F(P, S, c, i) = U1 xor U2 xor ... Uc * U1 = PRF(P, S || Int(i)) * U2 = PRF(P, U1) * Uc = PRF(P, Uc-1) */ static void F(char *password, unsigned char *ssid, int ssidlength, int iterations, int count, unsigned char *output) { unsigned char digest[36], digest1[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE]; int i, j, len; len = strlen(password); /* U1 = PRF(P, S || int(i)) */ memcpy(digest, ssid, ssidlength); digest[ssidlength] = (unsigned char)((count>>24) & 0xff); digest[ssidlength+1] = (unsigned char)((count>>16) & 0xff); digest[ssidlength+2] = (unsigned char)((count>>8) & 0xff); digest[ssidlength+3] = (unsigned char)(count & 0xff); RT_HMAC_SHA1((unsigned char*) password, len, digest, ssidlength+4, digest1, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE); /* for WPA update*/ /* output = U1 */ memcpy(output, digest1, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE); for (i = 1; i < iterations; i++) { /* Un = PRF(P, Un-1) */ RT_HMAC_SHA1((unsigned char*) password, len, digest1, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, digest, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE); /* for WPA update*/ memcpy(digest1, digest, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE); /* output = output xor Un */ for (j = 0; j < SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE; j++) { output[j] ^= digest[j]; } } } /* * password - ascii string up to 63 characters in length * ssid - octet string up to 32 octets * ssidlength - length of ssid in octets * output must be 40 octets in length and outputs 256 bits of key */ int RtmpPasswordHash(PSTRING password, PUCHAR ssid, INT ssidlength, PUCHAR output) { if ((strlen(password) > 63) || (ssidlength > 32)) return 0; F(password, ssid, ssidlength, 4096, 1, output); F(password, ssid, ssidlength, 4096, 2, &output[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE]); return 1; } /* ======================================================================== Routine Description: The key derivation function(KDF) is defined in IEEE 802.11r/D9.0, 8.5.1.5.2 Arguments: Return Value: Note: Output ¡ö KDF-Length (K, label, Context) where Input: K, a 256-bit key derivation key label, a string identifying the purpose of the keys derived using this KDF Context, a bit string that provides context to identify the derived key Length, the length of the derived key in bits Output: a Length-bit derived key result ¡ö "" iterations ¡ö (Length+255)/256 do i = 1 to iterations result ¡ö result || HMAC-SHA256(K, i || label || Context || Length) od return first Length bits of result, and securely delete all unused bits In this algorithm, i and Length are encoded as 16-bit unsigned integers. ======================================================================== */ VOID KDF( IN PUINT8 key, IN INT key_len, IN PUINT8 label, IN INT label_len, IN PUINT8 data, IN INT data_len, OUT PUINT8 output, IN USHORT len) { USHORT i; UCHAR *input; INT currentindex = 0; INT total_len; UINT len_in_bits = (len << 3); os_alloc_mem(NULL, (PUCHAR *)&input, 1024); if (input == NULL) { DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_ERROR, ("!!!KDF: no memory!!!\n")); return; } /* End of if */ NdisZeroMemory(input, 1024); /* Initial concatenated value (i || label || Context || Length)*/ /* concatenate 16-bit unsigned integer, its initial value is 1. */ input[0] = 1; input[1] = 0; total_len = 2; /* concatenate a prefix string*/ NdisMoveMemory(&input[total_len], label, label_len); total_len += label_len; /* concatenate the context*/ NdisMoveMemory(&input[total_len], data, data_len); total_len += data_len; /* concatenate the length in bits (16-bit unsigned integer)*/ input[total_len] = (len_in_bits & 0xFF); input[total_len + 1] = (len_in_bits & 0xFF00) >> 8; total_len += 2; for (i = 1; i <= ((len_in_bits + 255) / 256); i++) { /* HMAC-SHA256 derives output */ RT_HMAC_SHA256((UCHAR *)key, key_len, input, total_len, (UCHAR *)&output[currentindex], 32); currentindex += 32; /* next concatenation location*/ input[0]++; /* increment octet count*/ } os_free_mem(NULL, input); } /* ======================================================================== Routine Description: Arguments: Return Value: Note: ======================================================================== */ VOID RTMPDerivePMKID( IN PUINT8 pAaddr, IN PUINT8 pSpaddr, IN PUINT8 pKey, IN PUINT8 pAkm_oui, OUT PUINT8 pPMKID) { UCHAR digest[80], text_buf[20]; UINT8 text_len; /* Concatenate the text for PMKID calculation*/ NdisMoveMemory(&text_buf[0], "PMK Name", 8); NdisMoveMemory(&text_buf[8], pAaddr, MAC_ADDR_LEN); NdisMoveMemory(&text_buf[14], pSpaddr, MAC_ADDR_LEN); text_len = 20; { RT_HMAC_SHA1(pKey, PMK_LEN, text_buf, text_len, digest, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE); } /* Truncate the first 128-bit of output result */ NdisMoveMemory(pPMKID, digest, LEN_PMKID); } /* ======================================================================== Routine Description: It utilizes PRF-384 or PRF-512 to derive session-specific keys from a PMK. It shall be called by 4-way handshake processing. Arguments: pAd - pointer to our pAdapter context PMK - pointer to PMK ANonce - pointer to ANonce AA - pointer to Authenticator Address SNonce - pointer to SNonce SA - pointer to Supplicant Address len - indicate the length of PTK (octet) Return Value: Output pointer to the PTK Note: Refer to IEEE 802.11i-2004 8.5.1.2 ======================================================================== */ VOID WpaDerivePTK( IN PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd, IN UCHAR *PMK, IN UCHAR *ANonce, IN UCHAR *AA, IN UCHAR *SNonce, IN UCHAR *SA, OUT UCHAR *output, IN UINT len) { UCHAR concatenation[76]; UINT CurrPos = 0; UCHAR temp[32]; UCHAR Prefix[] = {'P', 'a', 'i', 'r', 'w', 'i', 's', 'e', ' ', 'k', 'e', 'y', ' ', 'e', 'x', 'p', 'a', 'n', 's', 'i', 'o', 'n'}; /* initiate the concatenation input*/ NdisZeroMemory(temp, sizeof(temp)); NdisZeroMemory(concatenation, 76); /* Get smaller address*/ if (RTMPCompareMemory(SA, AA, 6) == 1) NdisMoveMemory(concatenation, AA, 6); else NdisMoveMemory(concatenation, SA, 6); CurrPos += 6; /* Get larger address*/ if (RTMPCompareMemory(SA, AA, 6) == 1) NdisMoveMemory(&concatenation[CurrPos], SA, 6); else NdisMoveMemory(&concatenation[CurrPos], AA, 6); /* store the larger mac address for backward compatible of */ /* ralink proprietary STA-key issue */ NdisMoveMemory(temp, &concatenation[CurrPos], MAC_ADDR_LEN); CurrPos += 6; /* Get smaller Nonce*/ if (RTMPCompareMemory(ANonce, SNonce, 32) == 0) NdisMoveMemory(&concatenation[CurrPos], temp, 32); /* patch for ralink proprietary STA-key issue*/ else if (RTMPCompareMemory(ANonce, SNonce, 32) == 1) NdisMoveMemory(&concatenation[CurrPos], SNonce, 32); else NdisMoveMemory(&concatenation[CurrPos], ANonce, 32); CurrPos += 32; /* Get larger Nonce*/ if (RTMPCompareMemory(ANonce, SNonce, 32) == 0) NdisMoveMemory(&concatenation[CurrPos], temp, 32); /* patch for ralink proprietary STA-key issue*/ else if (RTMPCompareMemory(ANonce, SNonce, 32) == 1) NdisMoveMemory(&concatenation[CurrPos], ANonce, 32); else NdisMoveMemory(&concatenation[CurrPos], SNonce, 32); CurrPos += 32; hex_dump("PMK", PMK, LEN_PMK); hex_dump("concatenation=", concatenation, 76); /* Use PRF to generate PTK*/ PRF(PMK, LEN_PMK, Prefix, 22, concatenation, 76, output, len); } VOID WpaDeriveGTK( IN UCHAR *GMK, IN UCHAR *GNonce, IN UCHAR *AA, OUT UCHAR *output, IN UINT len) { UCHAR concatenation[76]; UINT CurrPos=0; UCHAR Prefix[19]; UCHAR temp[80]; NdisMoveMemory(&concatenation[CurrPos], AA, 6); CurrPos += 6; NdisMoveMemory(&concatenation[CurrPos], GNonce , 32); CurrPos += 32; Prefix[0] = 'G'; Prefix[1] = 'r'; Prefix[2] = 'o'; Prefix[3] = 'u'; Prefix[4] = 'p'; Prefix[5] = ' '; Prefix[6] = 'k'; Prefix[7] = 'e'; Prefix[8] = 'y'; Prefix[9] = ' '; Prefix[10] = 'e'; Prefix[11] = 'x'; Prefix[12] = 'p'; Prefix[13] = 'a'; Prefix[14] = 'n'; Prefix[15] = 's'; Prefix[16] = 'i'; Prefix[17] = 'o'; Prefix[18] = 'n'; PRF(GMK, PMK_LEN, Prefix, 19, concatenation, 38 , temp, len); NdisMoveMemory(output, temp, len); } /* ======================================================================== Routine Description: Generate random number by software. Arguments: pAd - pointer to our pAdapter context macAddr - pointer to local MAC address Return Value: Note: 802.1ii-2004 Annex H.5 ======================================================================== */ VOID GenRandom( IN PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd, IN UCHAR *macAddr, OUT UCHAR *random) { INT i, curr; UCHAR local[80], KeyCounter[32]; UCHAR result[80]; ULONG CurrentTime; UCHAR prefix[] = {'I', 'n', 'i', 't', ' ', 'C', 'o', 'u', 'n', 't', 'e', 'r'}; /* Zero the related information*/ NdisZeroMemory(result, 80); NdisZeroMemory(local, 80); NdisZeroMemory(KeyCounter, 32); for (i = 0; i < 32; i++) { /* copy the local MAC address*/ COPY_MAC_ADDR(local, macAddr); curr = MAC_ADDR_LEN; /* concatenate the current time*/ NdisGetSystemUpTime(&CurrentTime); NdisMoveMemory(&local[curr], &CurrentTime, sizeof(CurrentTime)); curr += sizeof(CurrentTime); /* concatenate the last result*/ NdisMoveMemory(&local[curr], result, 32); curr += 32; /* concatenate a variable */ NdisMoveMemory(&local[curr], &i, 2); curr += 2; /* calculate the result*/ PRF(KeyCounter, 32, prefix,12, local, curr, result, 32); } NdisMoveMemory(random, result, 32); } /* ======================================================================== Routine Description: Build cipher suite in RSN-IE. It only shall be called by RTMPMakeRSNIE. Arguments: pAd - pointer to our pAdapter context ElementID - indicate the WPA1 or WPA2 WepStatus - indicate the encryption type bMixCipher - a boolean to indicate the pairwise cipher and group cipher are the same or not Return Value: Note: ======================================================================== */ static VOID RTMPMakeRsnIeCipher( IN PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd, IN UCHAR ElementID, IN UINT WepStatus, IN UCHAR apidx, IN BOOLEAN bMixCipher, IN UCHAR FlexibleCipher, OUT PUCHAR pRsnIe, OUT UCHAR *rsn_len) { UCHAR PairwiseCnt; *rsn_len = 0; /* decide WPA2 or WPA1 */ if (ElementID == Wpa2Ie) { RSNIE2 *pRsnie_cipher = (RSNIE2*)pRsnIe; /* Assign the verson as 1*/ pRsnie_cipher->version = 1; switch (WepStatus) { /* TKIP mode*/ case Ndis802_11Encryption2Enabled: NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_cipher->mcast, OUI_WPA2_TKIP, 4); pRsnie_cipher->ucount = 1; NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_cipher->ucast[0].oui, OUI_WPA2_TKIP, 4); *rsn_len = sizeof(RSNIE2); break; /* AES mode*/ case Ndis802_11Encryption3Enabled: if (bMixCipher) NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_cipher->mcast, OUI_WPA2_TKIP, 4); else NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_cipher->mcast, OUI_WPA2_CCMP, 4); pRsnie_cipher->ucount = 1; NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_cipher->ucast[0].oui, OUI_WPA2_CCMP, 4); *rsn_len = sizeof(RSNIE2); break; /* TKIP-AES mix mode*/ case Ndis802_11Encryption4Enabled: NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_cipher->mcast, OUI_WPA2_TKIP, 4); PairwiseCnt = 1; /* Insert WPA2 TKIP as the first pairwise cipher */ if (MIX_CIPHER_WPA2_TKIP_ON(FlexibleCipher)) { NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_cipher->ucast[0].oui, OUI_WPA2_TKIP, 4); /* Insert WPA2 AES as the secondary pairwise cipher*/ if (MIX_CIPHER_WPA2_AES_ON(FlexibleCipher)) { NdisMoveMemory(pRsnIe + sizeof(RSNIE2), OUI_WPA2_CCMP, 4); PairwiseCnt = 2; } } else { /* Insert WPA2 AES as the first pairwise cipher */ NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_cipher->ucast[0].oui, OUI_WPA2_CCMP, 4); } pRsnie_cipher->ucount = PairwiseCnt; *rsn_len = sizeof(RSNIE2) + (4 * (PairwiseCnt - 1)); break; } #ifdef CONFIG_STA_SUPPORT if ((pAd->OpMode == OPMODE_STA) && (pAd->StaCfg.GroupCipher != Ndis802_11Encryption2Enabled) && (pAd->StaCfg.GroupCipher != Ndis802_11Encryption3Enabled) ) { UINT GroupCipher = pAd->StaCfg.GroupCipher; switch(GroupCipher) { case Ndis802_11GroupWEP40Enabled: NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_cipher->mcast, OUI_WPA2_WEP40, 4); break; case Ndis802_11GroupWEP104Enabled: NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_cipher->mcast, OUI_WPA2_WEP104, 4); break; } } #endif /* CONFIG_STA_SUPPORT */ /* swap for big-endian platform*/ pRsnie_cipher->version = cpu2le16(pRsnie_cipher->version); pRsnie_cipher->ucount = cpu2le16(pRsnie_cipher->ucount); } else { RSNIE *pRsnie_cipher = (RSNIE*)pRsnIe; /* Assign OUI and version*/ NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_cipher->oui, OUI_WPA_VERSION, 4); pRsnie_cipher->version = 1; switch (WepStatus) { /* TKIP mode*/ case Ndis802_11Encryption2Enabled: NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_cipher->mcast, OUI_WPA_TKIP, 4); pRsnie_cipher->ucount = 1; NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_cipher->ucast[0].oui, OUI_WPA_TKIP, 4); *rsn_len = sizeof(RSNIE); break; /* AES mode*/ case Ndis802_11Encryption3Enabled: if (bMixCipher) NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_cipher->mcast, OUI_WPA_TKIP, 4); else NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_cipher->mcast, OUI_WPA_CCMP, 4); pRsnie_cipher->ucount = 1; NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_cipher->ucast[0].oui, OUI_WPA_CCMP, 4); *rsn_len = sizeof(RSNIE); break; /* TKIP-AES mix mode*/ case Ndis802_11Encryption4Enabled: NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_cipher->mcast, OUI_WPA_TKIP, 4); PairwiseCnt = 1; /* Insert WPA TKIP as the first pairwise cipher */ if (MIX_CIPHER_WPA_TKIP_ON(FlexibleCipher)) { NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_cipher->ucast[0].oui, OUI_WPA_TKIP, 4); /* Insert WPA AES as the secondary pairwise cipher*/ if (MIX_CIPHER_WPA_AES_ON(FlexibleCipher)) { NdisMoveMemory(pRsnIe + sizeof(RSNIE), OUI_WPA_CCMP, 4); PairwiseCnt = 2; } } else { /* Insert WPA AES as the first pairwise cipher */ NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_cipher->ucast[0].oui, OUI_WPA_CCMP, 4); } pRsnie_cipher->ucount = PairwiseCnt; *rsn_len = sizeof(RSNIE) + (4 * (PairwiseCnt - 1)); break; } #ifdef CONFIG_STA_SUPPORT if ((pAd->OpMode == OPMODE_STA) && (pAd->StaCfg.GroupCipher != Ndis802_11Encryption2Enabled) && (pAd->StaCfg.GroupCipher != Ndis802_11Encryption3Enabled) ) { UINT GroupCipher = pAd->StaCfg.GroupCipher; switch(GroupCipher) { case Ndis802_11GroupWEP40Enabled: NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_cipher->mcast, OUI_WPA_WEP40, 4); break; case Ndis802_11GroupWEP104Enabled: NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_cipher->mcast, OUI_WPA_WEP104, 4); break; } } #endif /* CONFIG_STA_SUPPORT */ /* swap for big-endian platform*/ pRsnie_cipher->version = cpu2le16(pRsnie_cipher->version); pRsnie_cipher->ucount = cpu2le16(pRsnie_cipher->ucount); } } /* ======================================================================== Routine Description: Build AKM suite in RSN-IE. It only shall be called by RTMPMakeRSNIE. Arguments: pAd - pointer to our pAdapter context ElementID - indicate the WPA1 or WPA2 AuthMode - indicate the authentication mode apidx - indicate the interface index Return Value: Note: ======================================================================== */ static VOID RTMPMakeRsnIeAKM( IN PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd, IN UCHAR ElementID, IN UINT AuthMode, IN UCHAR apidx, OUT PUCHAR pRsnIe, OUT UCHAR *rsn_len) { RSNIE_AUTH *pRsnie_auth; UCHAR AkmCnt = 1; /* default as 1*/ pRsnie_auth = (RSNIE_AUTH*)(pRsnIe + (*rsn_len)); /* decide WPA2 or WPA1 */ if (ElementID == Wpa2Ie) { switch (AuthMode) { case Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA2: case Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA1WPA2: NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_auth->auth[0].oui, OUI_WPA2_8021X_AKM, 4); break; case Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA2PSK: case Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA1PSKWPA2PSK: NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_auth->auth[0].oui, OUI_WPA2_PSK_AKM, 4); break; default: AkmCnt = 0; break; } } else { switch (AuthMode) { case Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA: case Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA1WPA2: NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_auth->auth[0].oui, OUI_WPA_8021X_AKM, 4); break; case Ndis802_11AuthModeWPAPSK: case Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA1PSKWPA2PSK: NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_auth->auth[0].oui, OUI_WPA_PSK_AKM, 4); break; case Ndis802_11AuthModeWPANone: NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_auth->auth[0].oui, OUI_WPA_NONE_AKM, 4); break; default: AkmCnt = 0; break; } } pRsnie_auth->acount = AkmCnt; pRsnie_auth->acount = cpu2le16(pRsnie_auth->acount); /* update current RSNIE length*/ (*rsn_len) += (sizeof(RSNIE_AUTH) + (4 * (AkmCnt - 1))); } /* ======================================================================== Routine Description: Build capability in RSN-IE. It only shall be called by RTMPMakeRSNIE. Arguments: pAd - pointer to our pAdapter context ElementID - indicate the WPA1 or WPA2 apidx - indicate the interface index Return Value: Note: ======================================================================== */ static VOID RTMPMakeRsnIeCap( IN PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd, IN UCHAR ElementID, IN UCHAR apidx, OUT PUCHAR pRsnIe, OUT UCHAR *rsn_len) { RSN_CAPABILITIES *pRSN_Cap; /* it could be ignored in WPA1 mode*/ if (ElementID == WpaIe) return; pRSN_Cap = (RSN_CAPABILITIES*)(pRsnIe + (*rsn_len)); #ifdef CONFIG_STA_SUPPORT IF_DEV_CONFIG_OPMODE_ON_STA(pAd) { } #endif /* CONFIG_STA_SUPPORT */ pRSN_Cap->word = cpu2le16(pRSN_Cap->word); (*rsn_len) += sizeof(RSN_CAPABILITIES); /* update current RSNIE length*/ } /* ======================================================================== Routine Description: Build PMKID in RSN-IE. It only shall be called by RTMPMakeRSNIE. Arguments: pAd - pointer to our pAdapter context ElementID - indicate the WPA1 or WPA2 apidx - indicate the interface index Return Value: Note: ======================================================================== */ /* ======================================================================== Routine Description: Build RSN IE context. It is not included element-ID and length. Arguments: pAd - pointer to our pAdapter context AuthMode - indicate the authentication mode WepStatus - indicate the encryption type apidx - indicate the interface index Return Value: Note: ======================================================================== */ VOID RTMPMakeRSNIE( IN PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd, IN UINT AuthMode, IN UINT WepStatus, IN UCHAR apidx) { PUCHAR pRsnIe = NULL; /* primary RSNIE*/ UCHAR *rsnielen_cur_p = 0; /* the length of the primary RSNIE */ UCHAR *rsnielen_ex_cur_p = 0; /* the length of the secondary RSNIE */ UCHAR PrimaryRsnie; BOOLEAN bMixCipher = FALSE; /* indicate the pairwise and group cipher are different*/ UCHAR p_offset; WPA_MIX_PAIR_CIPHER FlexibleCipher = MIX_CIPHER_NOTUSE; /* it provide the more flexible cipher combination in WPA-WPA2 and TKIPAES mode*/ rsnielen_cur_p = NULL; rsnielen_ex_cur_p = NULL; do { #ifdef APCLI_SUPPORT if (apidx >= MIN_NET_DEVICE_FOR_APCLI) { UINT apcliIfidx = 0; /* Only support WPAPSK or WPA2PSK for AP-Client mode */ if ((AuthMode != Ndis802_11AuthModeWPAPSK) && (AuthMode != Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA2PSK)) return; DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE,("==> RTMPMakeRSNIE(ApCli)\n")); apcliIfidx = apidx - MIN_NET_DEVICE_FOR_APCLI; /* Initiate some related information */ if (apcliIfidx < MAX_APCLI_NUM) { pAd->ApCfg.ApCliTab[apcliIfidx].RSNIE_Len = 0; NdisZeroMemory(pAd->ApCfg.ApCliTab[apcliIfidx].RSN_IE, MAX_LEN_OF_RSNIE); rsnielen_cur_p = &pAd->ApCfg.ApCliTab[apcliIfidx].RSNIE_Len; pRsnIe = pAd->ApCfg.ApCliTab[apcliIfidx].RSN_IE; bMixCipher = pAd->ApCfg.ApCliTab[apcliIfidx].bMixCipher; break; } else { DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_ERROR, ("RTMPMakeRSNIE: invalid apcliIfidx(%d)\n", apcliIfidx)); return; } } #endif /* APCLI_SUPPORT */ #ifdef CONFIG_STA_SUPPORT IF_DEV_CONFIG_OPMODE_ON_STA(pAd) { #ifdef WPA_SUPPLICANT_SUPPORT if (pAd->StaCfg.WpaSupplicantUP != WPA_SUPPLICANT_DISABLE) { if (AuthMode < Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA) return; } else #endif /* WPA_SUPPLICANT_SUPPORT */ { /* Support WPAPSK or WPA2PSK in STA-Infra mode */ /* Support WPANone in STA-Adhoc mode */ if ((AuthMode != Ndis802_11AuthModeWPAPSK) && (AuthMode != Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA2PSK) && (AuthMode != Ndis802_11AuthModeWPANone) ) return; } DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE,("==> RTMPMakeRSNIE(STA)\n")); /* Zero RSNIE context */ pAd->StaCfg.RSNIE_Len = 0; NdisZeroMemory(pAd->StaCfg.RSN_IE, MAX_LEN_OF_RSNIE); /* Pointer to RSNIE */ rsnielen_cur_p = &pAd->StaCfg.RSNIE_Len; pRsnIe = pAd->StaCfg.RSN_IE; bMixCipher = pAd->StaCfg.bMixCipher; break; } #endif /* CONFIG_STA_SUPPORT */ } while(FALSE); /* indicate primary RSNIE as WPA or WPA2*/ if ((AuthMode == Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA) || (AuthMode == Ndis802_11AuthModeWPAPSK) || (AuthMode == Ndis802_11AuthModeWPANone) || (AuthMode == Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA1WPA2) || (AuthMode == Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA1PSKWPA2PSK)) PrimaryRsnie = WpaIe; else PrimaryRsnie = Wpa2Ie; { /* Build the primary RSNIE*/ /* 1. insert cipher suite*/ RTMPMakeRsnIeCipher(pAd, PrimaryRsnie, WepStatus, apidx, bMixCipher, FlexibleCipher, pRsnIe, &p_offset); /* 2. insert AKM*/ RTMPMakeRsnIeAKM(pAd, PrimaryRsnie, AuthMode, apidx, pRsnIe, &p_offset); /* 3. insert capability*/ RTMPMakeRsnIeCap(pAd, PrimaryRsnie, apidx, pRsnIe, &p_offset); } /* 4. update the RSNIE length*/ *rsnielen_cur_p = p_offset; hex_dump("The primary RSNIE", pRsnIe, (*rsnielen_cur_p)); } /* ========================================================================== Description: Check whether the received frame is EAP frame. Arguments: pAd - pointer to our pAdapter context pEntry - pointer to active entry pData - the received frame DataByteCount - the received frame's length FromWhichBSSID - indicate the interface index Return: TRUE - This frame is EAP frame FALSE - otherwise ========================================================================== */ BOOLEAN RTMPCheckWPAframe( IN PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd, IN PMAC_TABLE_ENTRY pEntry, IN PUCHAR pData, IN ULONG DataByteCount, IN UCHAR FromWhichBSSID) { ULONG Body_len; BOOLEAN Cancelled; do { } while (FALSE); if(DataByteCount < (LENGTH_802_1_H + LENGTH_EAPOL_H)) return FALSE; /* Skip LLC header */ if (NdisEqualMemory(SNAP_802_1H, pData, 6) || /* Cisco 1200 AP may send packet with SNAP_BRIDGE_TUNNEL*/ NdisEqualMemory(SNAP_BRIDGE_TUNNEL, pData, 6)) { pData += 6; } /* Skip 2-bytes EAPoL type */ if (NdisEqualMemory(EAPOL, pData, 2)) /* if (*(UINT16 *)EAPOL == *(UINT16 *)pData)*/ { pData += 2; } else return FALSE; switch (*(pData+1)) { case EAPPacket: Body_len = (*(pData+2)<<8) | (*(pData+3)); DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("Receive EAP-Packet frame, TYPE = 0, Length = %ld\n", Body_len)); break; case EAPOLStart: DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("Receive EAPOL-Start frame, TYPE = 1 \n")); if (pEntry->EnqueueEapolStartTimerRunning != EAPOL_START_DISABLE) { DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("Cancel the EnqueueEapolStartTimerRunning \n")); RTMPCancelTimer(&pEntry->EnqueueStartForPSKTimer, &Cancelled); pEntry->EnqueueEapolStartTimerRunning = EAPOL_START_DISABLE; } break; case EAPOLLogoff: DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("Receive EAPOLLogoff frame, TYPE = 2 \n")); break; case EAPOLKey: Body_len = (*(pData+2)<<8) | (*(pData+3)); DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("Receive EAPOL-Key frame, TYPE = 3, Length = %ld\n", Body_len)); break; case EAPOLASFAlert: DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("Receive EAPOLASFAlert frame, TYPE = 4 \n")); break; default: return FALSE; } return TRUE; } /* ========================================================================== Description: Report the EAP message type Arguments: msg - EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_1 EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_2 EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_3 EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_4 EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_1 EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_2 Return: message type string ========================================================================== */ PSTRING GetEapolMsgType(CHAR msg) { if(msg == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_1) return "Pairwise Message 1"; else if(msg == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_2) return "Pairwise Message 2"; else if(msg == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_3) return "Pairwise Message 3"; else if(msg == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_4) return "Pairwise Message 4"; else if(msg == EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_1) return "Group Message 1"; else if(msg == EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_2) return "Group Message 2"; else return "Invalid Message"; } /* ======================================================================== Routine Description: Check Sanity RSN IE of EAPoL message Arguments: Return Value: ======================================================================== */ BOOLEAN RTMPCheckRSNIE( IN PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd, IN PUCHAR pData, IN UCHAR DataLen, IN MAC_TABLE_ENTRY *pEntry, OUT UCHAR *Offset) { PUCHAR pVIE; UCHAR len; PEID_STRUCT pEid; BOOLEAN result = FALSE; pVIE = pData; len = DataLen; *Offset = 0; while (len > sizeof(RSNIE2)) { pEid = (PEID_STRUCT) pVIE; /* WPA RSN IE*/ if ((pEid->Eid == IE_WPA) && (NdisEqualMemory(pEid->Octet, WPA_OUI, 4))) { if ((pEntry->AuthMode == Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA || pEntry->AuthMode == Ndis802_11AuthModeWPAPSK) && (NdisEqualMemory(pVIE, pEntry->RSN_IE, pEntry->RSNIE_Len)) && (pEntry->RSNIE_Len == (pEid->Len + 2))) { result = TRUE; } *Offset += (pEid->Len + 2); } /* WPA2 RSN IE, doesn't need to check RSNIE Capabilities field */ else if ((pEid->Eid == IE_RSN) && (NdisEqualMemory(pEid->Octet + 2, RSN_OUI, 3))) { if ((pEntry->AuthMode == Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA2 || pEntry->AuthMode == Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA2PSK) && (pEid->Eid == pEntry->RSN_IE[0]) && ((pEid->Len + 2) >= pEntry->RSNIE_Len) && (NdisEqualMemory(pEid->Octet, &pEntry->RSN_IE[2], pEntry->RSNIE_Len - 4))) { result = TRUE; } *Offset += (pEid->Len + 2); } else { break; } pVIE += (pEid->Len + 2); len -= (pEid->Len + 2); } return result; } /* ======================================================================== Routine Description: Parse KEYDATA field. KEYDATA[] May contain 2 RSN IE and optionally GTK. GTK is encaptulated in KDE format at p.83 802.11i D10 Arguments: Return Value: Note: 802.11i D10 ======================================================================== */ BOOLEAN RTMPParseEapolKeyData( IN PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd, IN PUCHAR pKeyData, IN UCHAR KeyDataLen, IN UCHAR GroupKeyIndex, IN UCHAR MsgType, IN BOOLEAN bWPA2, IN MAC_TABLE_ENTRY *pEntry) { PUCHAR pMyKeyData = pKeyData; UCHAR KeyDataLength = KeyDataLen; UCHAR GTK[MAX_LEN_GTK]; UCHAR GTKLEN = 0; UCHAR DefaultIdx = 0; UCHAR skip_offset = 0; /* Verify The RSN IE contained in pairewise_msg_2 && pairewise_msg_3 and skip it*/ if (MsgType == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_2 || MsgType == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_3) { { if (bWPA2 && MsgType == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_3) { /*WpaShowAllsuite(pMyKeyData, skip_offset);*/ /* skip RSN IE*/ pMyKeyData += skip_offset; KeyDataLength -= skip_offset; DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("RTMPParseEapolKeyData ==> WPA2/WPA2PSK RSN IE matched in Msg 3, Length(%d) \n", skip_offset)); } else return TRUE; } } DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE,("RTMPParseEapolKeyData ==> KeyDataLength %d without RSN_IE \n", KeyDataLength)); /*hex_dump("remain data", pMyKeyData, KeyDataLength);*/ /* Parse KDE format in pairwise_msg_3_WPA2 && group_msg_1_WPA2*/ if (bWPA2 && (MsgType == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_3 || MsgType == EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_1)) { PEID_STRUCT pEid; pEid = (PEID_STRUCT) pMyKeyData; skip_offset = 0; while ((skip_offset + 2 + pEid->Len) <= KeyDataLength) { switch(pEid->Eid) { case WPA_KDE_TYPE: { PKDE_HDR pKDE; pKDE = (PKDE_HDR)pEid; if (NdisEqualMemory(pKDE->OUI, OUI_WPA2, 3)) { if (pKDE->DataType == KDE_GTK) { PGTK_KDE pKdeGtk; pKdeGtk = (PGTK_KDE) &pKDE->octet[0]; DefaultIdx = pKdeGtk->Kid; /* Get GTK length - refer to IEEE 802.11i-2004 p.82 */ GTKLEN = pKDE->Len -6; if (GTKLEN < LEN_WEP64) { DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_ERROR, ("ERROR: GTK Key length is too short (%d) \n", GTKLEN)); return FALSE; } NdisMoveMemory(GTK, pKdeGtk->GTK, GTKLEN); DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("GTK in KDE format ,DefaultKeyID=%d, KeyLen=%d \n", DefaultIdx, GTKLEN)); } } } break; } skip_offset = skip_offset + 2 + pEid->Len; pEid = (PEID_STRUCT)((UCHAR*)pEid + 2 + pEid->Len); } /* skip KDE Info*/ pMyKeyData += skip_offset; KeyDataLength -= skip_offset; } else if (!bWPA2 && MsgType == EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_1) { DefaultIdx = GroupKeyIndex; GTKLEN = KeyDataLength; NdisMoveMemory(GTK, pMyKeyData, KeyDataLength); DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("GTK without KDE, DefaultKeyID=%d, KeyLen=%d \n", DefaultIdx, GTKLEN)); } /* Sanity check - shared key index must be 0 ~ 3*/ if (DefaultIdx > 3) { DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_ERROR, ("ERROR: GTK Key index(%d) is invalid in %s %s \n", DefaultIdx, ((bWPA2) ? "WPA2" : "WPA"), GetEapolMsgType(MsgType))); return FALSE; } #ifdef CONFIG_STA_SUPPORT IF_DEV_CONFIG_OPMODE_ON_STA(pAd) { { { /* set key material, TxMic and RxMic */ NdisMoveMemory(pAd->StaCfg.GTK, GTK, GTKLEN); pAd->StaCfg.DefaultKeyId = DefaultIdx; WPAInstallSharedKey(pAd, pAd->StaCfg.GroupCipher, BSS0, pAd->StaCfg.DefaultKeyId, MCAST_WCID, FALSE, pAd->StaCfg.GTK, GTKLEN); } } } #endif /* CONFIG_STA_SUPPORT */ return TRUE; } /* ======================================================================== Routine Description: Construct KDE common format Its format is below, +--------------------+ | Type (0xdd) | 1 octet +--------------------+ | Length | 1 octet +--------------------+ | OUI | 3 octets +--------------------+ | Data Type | 1 octet +--------------------+ Arguments: Return Value: Note: It's defined in IEEE 802.11-2007 Figure 8-25. ======================================================================== */ VOID WPA_ConstructKdeHdr( IN UINT8 data_type, IN UINT8 data_len, OUT PUCHAR pBuf) { PKDE_HDR pHdr; pHdr = (PKDE_HDR)pBuf; NdisZeroMemory(pHdr, sizeof(KDE_HDR)); pHdr->Type = WPA_KDE_TYPE; /* The Length field specifies the number of octets in the OUI, Data Type, and Data fields. */ pHdr->Len = 4 + data_len; NdisMoveMemory(pHdr->OUI, OUI_WPA2, 3); pHdr->DataType = data_type; } /* ======================================================================== Routine Description: Construct EAPoL message for WPA handshaking Its format is below, +--------------------+ | Protocol Version | 1 octet +--------------------+ | Protocol Type | 1 octet +--------------------+ | Body Length | 2 octets +--------------------+ | Descriptor Type | 1 octet +--------------------+ | Key Information | 2 octets +--------------------+ | Key Length | 1 octet +--------------------+ | Key Repaly Counter | 8 octets +--------------------+ | Key Nonce | 32 octets +--------------------+ | Key IV | 16 octets +--------------------+ | Key RSC | 8 octets +--------------------+ | Key ID or Reserved | 8 octets +--------------------+ | Key MIC | 16 octets +--------------------+ | Key Data Length | 2 octets +--------------------+ | Key Data | n octets +--------------------+ Arguments: pAd Pointer to our adapter Return Value: None Note: ======================================================================== */ VOID ConstructEapolMsg( IN PMAC_TABLE_ENTRY pEntry, IN UCHAR GroupKeyWepStatus, IN UCHAR MsgType, IN UCHAR DefaultKeyIdx, IN UCHAR *KeyNonce, IN UCHAR *TxRSC, IN UCHAR *GTK, IN UCHAR *RSNIE, IN UCHAR RSNIE_Len, OUT PEAPOL_PACKET pMsg) { BOOLEAN bWPA2 = FALSE; UCHAR KeyDescVer; /* Choose WPA2 or not*/ if ((pEntry->AuthMode == Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA2) || (pEntry->AuthMode == Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA2PSK)) bWPA2 = TRUE; /* Init Packet and Fill header */ pMsg->ProVer = EAPOL_VER; pMsg->ProType = EAPOLKey; /* Default 95 bytes, the EAPoL-Key descriptor exclude Key-data field*/ SET_UINT16_TO_ARRARY(pMsg->Body_Len, MIN_LEN_OF_EAPOL_KEY_MSG); /* Fill in EAPoL descriptor*/ if (bWPA2) pMsg->KeyDesc.Type = WPA2_KEY_DESC; else pMsg->KeyDesc.Type = WPA1_KEY_DESC; /* Key Descriptor Version (bits 0-2) specifies the key descriptor version type*/ { /* Fill in Key information, refer to IEEE Std 802.11i-2004 page 78 */ /* When either the pairwise or the group cipher is AES, the KEY_DESC_AES shall be used.*/ KeyDescVer = (((pEntry->WepStatus == Ndis802_11Encryption3Enabled) || (GroupKeyWepStatus == Ndis802_11Encryption3Enabled)) ? (KEY_DESC_AES) : (KEY_DESC_TKIP)); } pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyInfo.KeyDescVer = KeyDescVer; /* Specify Key Type as Group(0) or Pairwise(1)*/ if (MsgType >= EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_1) pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyInfo.KeyType = GROUPKEY; else pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyInfo.KeyType = PAIRWISEKEY; /* Specify Key Index, only group_msg1_WPA1*/ if (!bWPA2 && (MsgType >= EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_1)) pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyInfo.KeyIndex = DefaultKeyIdx; if (MsgType == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_3) pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyInfo.Install = 1; if ((MsgType == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_1) || (MsgType == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_3) || (MsgType == EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_1)) pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyInfo.KeyAck = 1; if (MsgType != EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_1) pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyInfo.KeyMic = 1; if ((bWPA2 && (MsgType >= EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_3)) || (!bWPA2 && (MsgType >= EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_1))) { pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyInfo.Secure = 1; } /* This subfield shall be set, and the Key Data field shall be encrypted, if any key material (e.g., GTK or SMK) is included in the frame. */ if (bWPA2 && ((MsgType == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_3) || (MsgType == EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_1))) { pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyInfo.EKD_DL = 1; } /* key Information element has done. */ *(USHORT *)(&pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyInfo) = cpu2le16(*(USHORT *)(&pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyInfo)); /* Fill in Key Length*/ if (bWPA2) { /* In WPA2 mode, the field indicates the length of pairwise key cipher, */ /* so only pairwise_msg_1 and pairwise_msg_3 need to fill. */ if ((MsgType == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_1) || (MsgType == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_3)) pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyLength[1] = ((pEntry->WepStatus == Ndis802_11Encryption2Enabled) ? LEN_TKIP_TK : LEN_AES_TK); } else if (!bWPA2) { if (MsgType >= EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_1) { /* the length of group key cipher*/ pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyLength[1] = ((GroupKeyWepStatus == Ndis802_11Encryption2Enabled) ? LEN_TKIP_GTK : LEN_AES_GTK); } else { /* the length of pairwise key cipher*/ pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyLength[1] = ((pEntry->WepStatus == Ndis802_11Encryption2Enabled) ? LEN_TKIP_TK : LEN_AES_TK); } } /* Fill in replay counter */ NdisMoveMemory(pMsg->KeyDesc.ReplayCounter, pEntry->R_Counter, LEN_KEY_DESC_REPLAY); /* Fill Key Nonce field */ /* ANonce : pairwise_msg1 & pairwise_msg3*/ /* SNonce : pairwise_msg2*/ /* GNonce : group_msg1_wpa1 */ if ((MsgType <= EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_3) || ((!bWPA2 && (MsgType == EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_1)))) NdisMoveMemory(pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyNonce, KeyNonce, LEN_KEY_DESC_NONCE); /* Fill key IV - WPA2 as 0, WPA1 as random*/ if (!bWPA2 && (MsgType == EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_1)) { /* Suggest IV be random number plus some number,*/ NdisMoveMemory(pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyIv, &KeyNonce[16], LEN_KEY_DESC_IV); pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyIv[15] += 2; } /* Fill Key RSC field */ /* It contains the RSC for the GTK being installed.*/ if ((MsgType == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_3 && bWPA2) || (MsgType == EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_1)) { NdisMoveMemory(pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyRsc, TxRSC, 6); } /* Clear Key MIC field for MIC calculation later */ NdisZeroMemory(pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyMic, LEN_KEY_DESC_MIC); ConstructEapolKeyData(pEntry, GroupKeyWepStatus, KeyDescVer, MsgType, DefaultKeyIdx, GTK, RSNIE, RSNIE_Len, pMsg); /* Calculate MIC and fill in KeyMic Field except Pairwise Msg 1.*/ if (MsgType != EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_1) { CalculateMIC(KeyDescVer, pEntry->PTK, pMsg); } DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("===> ConstructEapolMsg for %s %s\n", ((bWPA2) ? "WPA2" : "WPA"), GetEapolMsgType(MsgType))); DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, (" Body length = %d \n", CONV_ARRARY_TO_UINT16(pMsg->Body_Len))); DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, (" Key length = %d \n", CONV_ARRARY_TO_UINT16(pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyLength))); } /* ======================================================================== Routine Description: Construct the Key Data field of EAPoL message Arguments: pAd Pointer to our adapter Elem Message body Return Value: None Note: ======================================================================== */ VOID ConstructEapolKeyData( IN PMAC_TABLE_ENTRY pEntry, IN UCHAR GroupKeyWepStatus, IN UCHAR keyDescVer, IN UCHAR MsgType, IN UCHAR DefaultKeyIdx, IN UCHAR *GTK, IN UCHAR *RSNIE, IN UCHAR RSNIE_LEN, OUT PEAPOL_PACKET pMsg) { UCHAR *mpool, *Key_Data, *eGTK; ULONG data_offset; BOOLEAN bWPA2Capable = FALSE; BOOLEAN GTK_Included = FALSE; /* Choose WPA2 or not*/ if ((pEntry->AuthMode == Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA2) || (pEntry->AuthMode == Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA2PSK)) bWPA2Capable = TRUE; if (MsgType == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_1 || MsgType == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_4 || MsgType == EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_2) return; /* allocate memory pool*/ os_alloc_mem(NULL, (PUCHAR *)&mpool, 1500); if (mpool == NULL) return; /* eGTK Len = 512 */ eGTK = (UCHAR *) ROUND_UP(mpool, 4); /* Key_Data Len = 512 */ Key_Data = (UCHAR *) ROUND_UP(eGTK + 512, 4); NdisZeroMemory(Key_Data, 512); SET_UINT16_TO_ARRARY(pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyDataLen, 0); data_offset = 0; /* Encapsulate RSNIE in pairwise_msg2 & pairwise_msg3 */ if (RSNIE_LEN && ((MsgType == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_2) || (MsgType == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_3))) { PUINT8 pmkid_ptr = NULL; UINT8 pmkid_len = 0; RTMPInsertRSNIE(&Key_Data[data_offset], &data_offset, RSNIE, RSNIE_LEN, pmkid_ptr, pmkid_len); } /* Encapsulate GTK */ /* Only for pairwise_msg3_WPA2 and group_msg1*/ if ((MsgType == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_3 && bWPA2Capable) || (MsgType == EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_1)) { UINT8 gtk_len; /* Decide the GTK length */ if (GroupKeyWepStatus == Ndis802_11Encryption3Enabled) gtk_len = LEN_AES_GTK; else gtk_len = LEN_TKIP_GTK; /* Insert GTK KDE format in WAP2 mode */ if (bWPA2Capable) { /* Construct the common KDE format */ WPA_ConstructKdeHdr(KDE_GTK, 2 + gtk_len, &Key_Data[data_offset]); data_offset += sizeof(KDE_HDR); /* GTK KDE format - 802.11i-2004 Figure-43x*/ Key_Data[data_offset] = (DefaultKeyIdx & 0x03); Key_Data[data_offset + 1] = 0x00; /* Reserved Byte*/ data_offset += 2; } /* Fill in GTK */ NdisMoveMemory(&Key_Data[data_offset], GTK, gtk_len); data_offset += gtk_len; GTK_Included = TRUE; } /* If the Encrypted Key Data subfield (of the Key Information field) is set, the entire Key Data field shall be encrypted. */ /* This whole key-data field shall be encrypted if a GTK is included.*/ /* Encrypt the data material in key data field with KEK*/ if (GTK_Included) { /*hex_dump("GTK_Included", Key_Data, data_offset);*/ if ( (keyDescVer == KEY_DESC_AES)) { UCHAR remainder = 0; UCHAR pad_len = 0; UINT wrap_len =0; /* Key Descriptor Version 2 or 3: AES key wrap, defined in IETF RFC 3394, */ /* shall be used to encrypt the Key Data field using the KEK field from */ /* the derived PTK.*/ /* If the Key Data field uses the NIST AES key wrap, then the Key Data field */ /* shall be padded before encrypting if the key data length is less than 16 */ /* octets or if it is not a multiple of 8. The padding consists of appending*/ /* a single octet 0xdd followed by zero or more 0x00 octets. */ if ((remainder = data_offset & 0x07) != 0) { INT i; pad_len = (8 - remainder); Key_Data[data_offset] = 0xDD; for (i = 1; i < pad_len; i++) Key_Data[data_offset + i] = 0; data_offset += pad_len; } AES_Key_Wrap(Key_Data, (UINT) data_offset, &pEntry->PTK[LEN_PTK_KCK], LEN_PTK_KEK, eGTK, &wrap_len); data_offset = wrap_len; } else { TKIP_GTK_KEY_WRAP(&pEntry->PTK[LEN_PTK_KCK], pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyIv, Key_Data, data_offset, eGTK); } NdisMoveMemory(pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyData, eGTK, data_offset); } else { NdisMoveMemory(pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyData, Key_Data, data_offset); } /* Update key data length field and total body length*/ SET_UINT16_TO_ARRARY(pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyDataLen, data_offset); INC_UINT16_TO_ARRARY(pMsg->Body_Len, data_offset); os_free_mem(NULL, mpool); } /* ======================================================================== Routine Description: Calcaulate MIC. It is used during 4-ways handsharking. Arguments: pAd - pointer to our pAdapter context PeerWepStatus - indicate the encryption type Return Value: Note: The EAPOL-Key MIC is a MIC of the EAPOL-Key frames, from and including the EAPOL protocol version field to and including the Key Data field, calculated with the Key MIC field set to 0. ======================================================================== */ VOID CalculateMIC( IN UCHAR KeyDescVer, IN UCHAR *PTK, OUT PEAPOL_PACKET pMsg) { UCHAR *OutBuffer; ULONG FrameLen = 0; UCHAR mic[LEN_KEY_DESC_MIC]; UCHAR digest[80]; /* allocate memory for MIC calculation*/ os_alloc_mem(NULL, (PUCHAR *)&OutBuffer, 512); if (OutBuffer == NULL) { DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_ERROR, ("!!!CalculateMIC: no memory!!!\n")); return; } /* make a frame for calculating MIC.*/ MakeOutgoingFrame(OutBuffer, &FrameLen, CONV_ARRARY_TO_UINT16(pMsg->Body_Len) + 4, pMsg, END_OF_ARGS); NdisZeroMemory(mic, sizeof(mic)); /* Calculate MIC*/ if (KeyDescVer == KEY_DESC_AES) { RT_HMAC_SHA1(PTK, LEN_PTK_KCK, OutBuffer, FrameLen, digest, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE); NdisMoveMemory(mic, digest, LEN_KEY_DESC_MIC); } else { RT_HMAC_MD5(PTK, LEN_PTK_KCK, OutBuffer, FrameLen, mic, MD5_DIGEST_SIZE); } /* store the calculated MIC*/ NdisMoveMemory(pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyMic, mic, LEN_KEY_DESC_MIC); os_free_mem(NULL, OutBuffer); } UCHAR RTMPExtractKeyIdxFromIVHdr( IN PUCHAR pIV, IN UINT8 CipherAlg) { UCHAR keyIdx = 0xFF; /* extract the key index from IV header */ switch (CipherAlg) { case Ndis802_11Encryption1Enabled: case Ndis802_11Encryption2Enabled: case Ndis802_11Encryption3Enabled: keyIdx = (*(pIV + 3) & 0xc0) >> 6; break; } return keyIdx; } PCIPHER_KEY RTMPSwCipherKeySelection( IN PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd, IN PUCHAR pIV, IN RX_BLK *pRxBlk, IN PMAC_TABLE_ENTRY pEntry) { PCIPHER_KEY pKey = NULL; UCHAR keyIdx = 0; UINT8 CipherAlg = Ndis802_11EncryptionDisabled; PRT28XX_RXD_STRUC pRxD = &(pRxBlk->RxD); if ((pEntry == NULL) || (RX_BLK_TEST_FLAG(pRxBlk, fRX_APCLI)) || (RX_BLK_TEST_FLAG(pRxBlk, fRX_WDS)) || (RX_BLK_TEST_FLAG(pRxBlk, fRX_MESH))) return NULL; if (pRxD->U2M) { CipherAlg = pEntry->WepStatus; } else { #ifdef CONFIG_STA_SUPPORT IF_DEV_CONFIG_OPMODE_ON_STA(pAd) { CipherAlg = pAd->StaCfg.GroupCipher; } #endif /* CONFIG_STA_SUPPORT */ } if ((keyIdx = RTMPExtractKeyIdxFromIVHdr(pIV, CipherAlg)) > 3) { DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_ERROR, ("%s : Invalid key index(%d) !!!\n", __FUNCTION__, keyIdx)); return NULL; } if (CipherAlg == Ndis802_11Encryption1Enabled) { pKey = &pAd->SharedKey[pEntry->apidx][keyIdx]; } else if ((CipherAlg == Ndis802_11Encryption2Enabled) || (CipherAlg == Ndis802_11Encryption3Enabled)) { if (pRxD->U2M) pKey = &pEntry->PairwiseKey; else { #ifdef CONFIG_STA_SUPPORT #endif /* CONFIG_STA_SUPPORT */ pKey = &pAd->SharedKey[pEntry->apidx][keyIdx]; } } return pKey; } /* ======================================================================== Routine Description: Some received frames can't decrypt by Asic, so decrypt them by software. Arguments: pAd - pointer to our pAdapter context PeerWepStatus - indicate the encryption type Return Value: NDIS_STATUS_SUCCESS - decryption successful NDIS_STATUS_FAILURE - decryption failure ======================================================================== */ NDIS_STATUS RTMPSoftDecryptionAction( IN PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd, IN PUCHAR pHdr, IN UCHAR UserPriority, IN PCIPHER_KEY pKey, INOUT PUCHAR pData, INOUT UINT16 *DataByteCnt) { switch (pKey->CipherAlg) { case CIPHER_WEP64: case CIPHER_WEP128: /* handle WEP decryption */ if (RTMPSoftDecryptWEP(pAd, pKey, pData, &(*DataByteCnt)) == FALSE) { DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_ERROR, ("ERROR : SW decrypt WEP data fails.\n")); /* give up this frame*/ return NDIS_STATUS_FAILURE; } break; case CIPHER_TKIP: /* handle TKIP decryption */ if (RTMPSoftDecryptTKIP(pAd, pHdr, UserPriority, pKey, pData, &(*DataByteCnt)) == FALSE) { DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_ERROR, ("ERROR : SW decrypt TKIP data fails.\n")); /* give up this frame*/ return NDIS_STATUS_FAILURE; } break; case CIPHER_AES: /* handle AES decryption */ if (RTMPSoftDecryptCCMP(pAd, pHdr, pKey, pData, &(*DataByteCnt)) == FALSE) { DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_ERROR, ("ERROR : SW decrypt AES data fails.\n")); /* give up this frame*/ return NDIS_STATUS_FAILURE; } break; default: /* give up this frame*/ return NDIS_STATUS_FAILURE; break; } return NDIS_STATUS_SUCCESS; } VOID RTMPSoftConstructIVHdr( IN UCHAR CipherAlg, IN UCHAR key_id, IN PUCHAR pTxIv, OUT PUCHAR pHdrIv, OUT UINT8 *hdr_iv_len) { *hdr_iv_len = 0; if ((CipherAlg == CIPHER_WEP64) || (CipherAlg == CIPHER_WEP128)) { /* Construct and insert 4-bytes WEP IV header to MPDU header */ RTMPConstructWEPIVHdr(key_id, pTxIv, pHdrIv); *hdr_iv_len = LEN_WEP_IV_HDR; } else if (CipherAlg == CIPHER_TKIP) ; else if (CipherAlg == CIPHER_AES) { /* Construct and insert 8-bytes CCMP header to MPDU header */ RTMPConstructCCMPHdr(key_id, pTxIv, pHdrIv); *hdr_iv_len = LEN_CCMP_HDR; } } VOID RTMPSoftEncryptionAction( IN PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd, IN UCHAR CipherAlg, IN PUCHAR pHdr, IN PUCHAR pSrcBufData, IN UINT32 SrcBufLen, IN UCHAR KeyIdx, IN PCIPHER_KEY pKey, OUT UINT8 *ext_len) { *ext_len = 0; if ((CipherAlg == CIPHER_WEP64) || (CipherAlg == CIPHER_WEP128)) { /* Encrypt the MPDU data by software*/ RTMPSoftEncryptWEP(pAd, pKey->TxTsc, pKey, pSrcBufData, SrcBufLen); *ext_len = LEN_ICV; } else if (CipherAlg == CIPHER_TKIP) ; else if (CipherAlg == CIPHER_AES) { /* Encrypt the MPDU data by software*/ RTMPSoftEncryptCCMP(pAd, pHdr, pKey->TxTsc, pKey->Key, pSrcBufData, SrcBufLen); *ext_len = LEN_CCMP_MIC; } } PUINT8 WPA_ExtractSuiteFromRSNIE( IN PUINT8 rsnie, IN UINT rsnie_len, IN UINT8 type, OUT UINT8 *count) { PEID_STRUCT pEid; INT len; PUINT8 pBuf; INT offset = 0; pEid = (PEID_STRUCT)rsnie; len = rsnie_len - 2; /* exclude IE and length*/ pBuf = (PUINT8)&pEid->Octet[0]; /* set default value*/ *count = 0; /* Check length*/ if ((len <= 0) || (pEid->Len != len)) { DBGPRINT_ERR(("%s : The length is invalid\n", __FUNCTION__)); goto out; } /* Check WPA or WPA2*/ if (pEid->Eid == IE_WPA) { /* Check the length */ if (len < sizeof(RSNIE)) { DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_ERROR, ("%s : The length is too short for WPA\n", __FUNCTION__)); goto out; } else { PRSNIE pRsnie; UINT16 u_cnt; pRsnie = (PRSNIE)pBuf; u_cnt = cpu2le16(pRsnie->ucount); offset = sizeof(RSNIE) + (LEN_OUI_SUITE * (u_cnt - 1)); if (len < offset) { DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_ERROR, ("%s : The expected lenght(%d) exceed the remaining length(%d) for WPA-RSN \n", __FUNCTION__, offset, len)); goto out; } else { /* Get the group cipher*/ if (type == GROUP_SUITE) { *count = 1; return pRsnie->mcast; } /* Get the pairwise cipher suite*/ else if (type == PAIRWISE_SUITE) { DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("%s : The count of pairwise cipher is %d\n", __FUNCTION__, u_cnt)); *count = u_cnt; return pRsnie->ucast[0].oui; } } } } else if (pEid->Eid == IE_RSN) { if (len < sizeof(RSNIE2)) { DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_ERROR, ("%s : The length is too short for WPA2\n", __FUNCTION__)); goto out; } else { PRSNIE2 pRsnie2; UINT16 u_cnt; pRsnie2 = (PRSNIE2)pBuf; u_cnt = cpu2le16(pRsnie2->ucount); offset = sizeof(RSNIE2) + (LEN_OUI_SUITE * (u_cnt - 1)); if (len < offset) { DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_ERROR, ("%s : The expected lenght(%d) exceed the remaining length(%d) for WPA2-RSN \n", __FUNCTION__, offset, len)); goto out; } else { /* Get the group cipher*/ if (type == GROUP_SUITE) { *count = 1; return pRsnie2->mcast; } /* Get the pairwise cipher suite*/ else if (type == PAIRWISE_SUITE) { DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("%s : The count of pairwise cipher is %d\n", __FUNCTION__, u_cnt)); *count = u_cnt; return pRsnie2->ucast[0].oui; } } } } else { DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_ERROR, ("%s : Unknown IE (%d)\n", __FUNCTION__, pEid->Eid)); goto out; } /* skip group cipher and pairwise cipher suite */ pBuf += offset; len -= offset; /* Ready to extract the AKM information and its count */ if (len < sizeof(RSNIE_AUTH)) { DBGPRINT_ERR(("%s : The length of AKM of RSN is too short\n", __FUNCTION__)); goto out; } else { PRSNIE_AUTH pAkm; UINT16 a_cnt; /* pointer to AKM count */ pAkm = (PRSNIE_AUTH)pBuf; a_cnt = cpu2le16(pAkm->acount); offset = sizeof(RSNIE_AUTH) + (LEN_OUI_SUITE * (a_cnt - 1)); if (len < offset) { DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_ERROR, ("%s : The expected lenght(%d) exceed the remaining length(%d) for AKM \n", __FUNCTION__, offset, len)); goto out; } else { /* Get the AKM suite */ if (type == AKM_SUITE) { DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("%s : The count of AKM is %d\n", __FUNCTION__, a_cnt)); *count = a_cnt; return pAkm->auth[0].oui; } } } /* For WPA1, the remaining shall be ignored. */ if (pEid->Eid == IE_WPA) { DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("%s : The remaining shall be ignored in WPA mode\n", __FUNCTION__)); goto out; } /* skip the AKM capability */ pBuf += offset; len -= offset; /* Parse the RSN Capabilities */ if (len < sizeof(RSN_CAPABILITIES)) { DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("%s : The peer RSNIE doesn't include RSN-Cap\n", __FUNCTION__)); goto out; } else { /* Report the content of the RSN capabilities */ if (type == RSN_CAP_INFO) { DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("%s : Extract RSN Capabilities\n", __FUNCTION__)); *count = 1; return pBuf; } /* skip RSN capability (2-bytes) */ offset = sizeof(RSN_CAPABILITIES); pBuf += offset; len -= offset; } /* Extract PMKID-list field */ if (len < sizeof(UINT16)) { DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("%s : The peer RSNIE doesn't include PMKID list Count\n", __FUNCTION__)); goto out; } else { UINT16 p_count; PUINT8 pPmkidList = NULL; NdisMoveMemory(&p_count, pBuf, sizeof(UINT16)); p_count = cpu2le16(p_count); /* Get count of the PMKID list */ if (p_count > 0) { PRSNIE_PMKID pRsnPmkid; /* the expected length of PMKID-List field */ offset = sizeof(RSNIE_PMKID) + (LEN_PMKID * (p_count - 1)); /* sanity check about the length of PMKID-List field */ if (len < offset) { DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_ERROR, ("%s : The expected lenght(%d) exceed the remaining length(%d) in PMKID-field \n", __FUNCTION__, offset, len)); goto out; } /* pointer to PMKID field */ pRsnPmkid = (PRSNIE_PMKID)pBuf; pPmkidList = pRsnPmkid->pmkid[0].list; } else { /* The PMKID field shall be without PMKID-List */ offset = sizeof(UINT16); pPmkidList = NULL; } /* Extract PMKID list and its count */ if (type == PMKID_LIST) { *count = p_count; return pPmkidList; } /* skip the PMKID field */ pBuf += offset; len -= offset; } out: *count = 0; return NULL; } VOID WpaShowAllsuite( IN PUINT8 rsnie, IN UINT rsnie_len) { PUINT8 pSuite = NULL; UINT8 count; hex_dump("RSNIE", rsnie, rsnie_len); /* group cipher*/ if ((pSuite = WPA_ExtractSuiteFromRSNIE(rsnie, rsnie_len, GROUP_SUITE, &count)) != NULL) { hex_dump("group cipher", pSuite, 4*count); } /* pairwise cipher*/ if ((pSuite = WPA_ExtractSuiteFromRSNIE(rsnie, rsnie_len, PAIRWISE_SUITE, &count)) != NULL) { hex_dump("pairwise cipher", pSuite, 4*count); } /* AKM*/ if ((pSuite = WPA_ExtractSuiteFromRSNIE(rsnie, rsnie_len, AKM_SUITE, &count)) != NULL) { hex_dump("AKM suite", pSuite, 4*count); } /* PMKID*/ if ((pSuite = WPA_ExtractSuiteFromRSNIE(rsnie, rsnie_len, PMKID_LIST, &count)) != NULL) { hex_dump("PMKID", pSuite, LEN_PMKID); } } VOID RTMPInsertRSNIE( IN PUCHAR pFrameBuf, OUT PULONG pFrameLen, IN PUINT8 rsnie_ptr, IN UINT8 rsnie_len, IN PUINT8 pmkid_ptr, IN UINT8 pmkid_len) { PUCHAR pTmpBuf; ULONG TempLen = 0; UINT8 extra_len = 0; UINT16 pmk_count = 0; UCHAR ie_num; UINT8 total_len = 0; UCHAR WPA2_OUI[3]={0x00,0x0F,0xAC}; pTmpBuf = pFrameBuf; /* PMKID-List Must larger than 0 and the multiple of 16. */ if (pmkid_len > 0 && ((pmkid_len & 0x0f) == 0)) { extra_len = sizeof(UINT16) + pmkid_len; pmk_count = (pmkid_len >> 4); pmk_count = cpu2le16(pmk_count); } else { DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("%s : no PMKID-List included(%d).\n", __FUNCTION__, pmkid_len)); } if (rsnie_len != 0) { ie_num = IE_WPA; total_len = rsnie_len; if (NdisEqualMemory(rsnie_ptr + 2, WPA2_OUI, sizeof(WPA2_OUI))) { ie_num = IE_RSN; total_len += extra_len; } /* construct RSNIE body */ MakeOutgoingFrame(pTmpBuf, &TempLen, 1, &ie_num, 1, &total_len, rsnie_len, rsnie_ptr, END_OF_ARGS); pTmpBuf += TempLen; *pFrameLen = *pFrameLen + TempLen; if (ie_num == IE_RSN) { /* Insert PMKID-List field */ if (extra_len > 0) { MakeOutgoingFrame(pTmpBuf, &TempLen, 2, &pmk_count, pmkid_len, pmkid_ptr, END_OF_ARGS); pTmpBuf += TempLen; *pFrameLen = *pFrameLen + TempLen; } } } return; } VOID WPAInstallPairwiseKey( PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd, UINT8 BssIdx, PMAC_TABLE_ENTRY pEntry, BOOLEAN bAE) { NdisZeroMemory(&pEntry->PairwiseKey, sizeof(CIPHER_KEY)); /* Assign the pairwise cipher algorithm */ if (pEntry->WepStatus == Ndis802_11Encryption2Enabled) pEntry->PairwiseKey.CipherAlg = CIPHER_TKIP; else if (pEntry->WepStatus == Ndis802_11Encryption3Enabled) pEntry->PairwiseKey.CipherAlg = CIPHER_AES; else { DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_ERROR, ("%s : fails (wcid-%d)\n", __FUNCTION__, pEntry->Aid)); return; } /* Assign key material and its length */ pEntry->PairwiseKey.KeyLen = LEN_TK; NdisMoveMemory(pEntry->PairwiseKey.Key, &pEntry->PTK[OFFSET_OF_PTK_TK], LEN_TK); if (pEntry->PairwiseKey.CipherAlg == CIPHER_TKIP) { if (bAE) { NdisMoveMemory(pEntry->PairwiseKey.TxMic, &pEntry->PTK[OFFSET_OF_AP_TKIP_TX_MIC], LEN_TKIP_MIC); NdisMoveMemory(pEntry->PairwiseKey.RxMic, &pEntry->PTK[OFFSET_OF_AP_TKIP_RX_MIC], LEN_TKIP_MIC); } else { NdisMoveMemory(pEntry->PairwiseKey.TxMic, &pEntry->PTK[OFFSET_OF_STA_TKIP_TX_MIC], LEN_TKIP_MIC); NdisMoveMemory(pEntry->PairwiseKey.RxMic, &pEntry->PTK[OFFSET_OF_STA_TKIP_RX_MIC], LEN_TKIP_MIC); } } #ifdef SOFT_ENCRYPT if (CLIENT_STATUS_TEST_FLAG(pEntry, fCLIENT_STATUS_SOFTWARE_ENCRYPT)) { DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("===> SW_ENC ON(wcid=%d) \n", pEntry->Aid)); NdisZeroMemory(pEntry->PairwiseKey.TxTsc, LEN_WPA_TSC); NdisZeroMemory(pEntry->PairwiseKey.RxTsc, LEN_WPA_TSC); } else #endif /* SOFT_ENCRYPT */ { /* Add Pair-wise key to Asic */ AsicAddPairwiseKeyEntry( pAd, (UCHAR)pEntry->Aid, &pEntry->PairwiseKey); RTMPSetWcidSecurityInfo(pAd, BssIdx, 0, pEntry->PairwiseKey.CipherAlg, (UCHAR)pEntry->Aid, PAIRWISEKEYTABLE); } } VOID WPAInstallSharedKey( PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd, UINT8 GroupCipher, UINT8 BssIdx, UINT8 KeyIdx, UINT8 Wcid, BOOLEAN bAE, PUINT8 pGtk, UINT8 GtkLen) { PCIPHER_KEY pSharedKey; if (BssIdx >= MAX_MBSSID_NUM(pAd)) { DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_ERROR, ("%s : The BSS-index(%d) is out of range for MBSSID link. \n", __FUNCTION__, BssIdx)); return; } pSharedKey = &pAd->SharedKey[BssIdx][KeyIdx]; NdisZeroMemory(pSharedKey, sizeof(CIPHER_KEY)); /* Set the group cipher */ if (GroupCipher == Ndis802_11GroupWEP40Enabled) pSharedKey->CipherAlg = CIPHER_WEP64; else if (GroupCipher == Ndis802_11GroupWEP104Enabled) pSharedKey->CipherAlg = CIPHER_WEP128; else if (GroupCipher == Ndis802_11Encryption2Enabled) pSharedKey->CipherAlg = CIPHER_TKIP; else if (GroupCipher == Ndis802_11Encryption3Enabled) pSharedKey->CipherAlg = CIPHER_AES; else { DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_ERROR, ("%s : fails (IF/ra%d) \n", __FUNCTION__, BssIdx)); return; } /* Set the key material and its length */ if (GroupCipher == Ndis802_11GroupWEP40Enabled || GroupCipher == Ndis802_11GroupWEP104Enabled) { /* Sanity check the length */ if ((GtkLen != LEN_WEP64) && (GtkLen != LEN_WEP128)) { DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_ERROR, ("%s : (IF/ra%d) WEP key invlaid(%d) \n", __FUNCTION__, BssIdx, GtkLen)); return; } pSharedKey->KeyLen = GtkLen; NdisMoveMemory(pSharedKey->Key, pGtk, GtkLen); } else { /* Sanity check the length */ if (GtkLen < LEN_TK) { DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_ERROR, ("%s : (IF/ra%d) WPA key invlaid(%d) \n", __FUNCTION__, BssIdx, GtkLen)); return; } pSharedKey->KeyLen = LEN_TK; NdisMoveMemory(pSharedKey->Key, pGtk, LEN_TK); if (pSharedKey->CipherAlg == CIPHER_TKIP) { if (bAE) { NdisMoveMemory(pSharedKey->TxMic, pGtk + 16, LEN_TKIP_MIC); NdisMoveMemory(pSharedKey->RxMic, pGtk + 24, LEN_TKIP_MIC); } else { NdisMoveMemory(pSharedKey->TxMic, pGtk + 24, LEN_TKIP_MIC); NdisMoveMemory(pSharedKey->RxMic, pGtk + 16, LEN_TKIP_MIC); } } } /* Update group key table(0x6C00) and group key mode(0x7000) */ AsicAddSharedKeyEntry( pAd, BssIdx, KeyIdx, pSharedKey); /* When Wcid isn't zero, it means that this is a Authenticator Role. Only Authenticator entity needs to set HW IE/EIV table (0x6000) and WCID attribute table (0x6800) for group key. */ if (Wcid != 0) { RTMPSetWcidSecurityInfo(pAd, BssIdx, KeyIdx, pSharedKey->CipherAlg, Wcid, SHAREDKEYTABLE); } } VOID RTMPSetWcidSecurityInfo( PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd, UINT8 BssIdx, UINT8 KeyIdx, UINT8 CipherAlg, UINT8 Wcid, UINT8 KeyTabFlag) { UINT32 IV = 0; UINT8 IV_KEYID = 0; /* Prepare initial IV value */ if (CipherAlg == CIPHER_WEP64 || CipherAlg == CIPHER_WEP128) { INT i; UCHAR TxTsc[LEN_WEP_TSC]; /* Generate 3-bytes IV randomly for encryption using */ for(i = 0; i < LEN_WEP_TSC; i++) TxTsc[i] = RandomByte(pAd); /* Update HW IVEIV table */ IV_KEYID = (KeyIdx << 6); IV = (IV_KEYID << 24) | (TxTsc[2] << 16) | (TxTsc[1] << 8) | (TxTsc[0]); } else if (CipherAlg == CIPHER_TKIP || CipherAlg == CIPHER_AES) { /* Set IVEIV as 1 in Asic - In IEEE 802.11-2007 8.3.3.4.3 described : The PN shall be implemented as a 48-bit monotonically incrementing non-negative integer, initialized to 1 when the corresponding temporal key is initialized or refreshed. */ IV_KEYID = (KeyIdx << 6) | 0x20; IV = (IV_KEYID << 24) | 1; } else { DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_ERROR, ("%s : Unsupport cipher Alg (%d) for Wcid-%d \n", __FUNCTION__, CipherAlg, Wcid)); return; } /* Update WCID IV/EIV table */ AsicUpdateWCIDIVEIV(pAd, Wcid, IV, 0); /* Update WCID attribute entry */ AsicUpdateWcidAttributeEntry(pAd, BssIdx, KeyIdx, CipherAlg, Wcid, KeyTabFlag); }